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ABSTRACT
The present study is an attempt to investigate an important aspect of Turkish 
secularism in the intellectual realm. According to the author of this study, 
positivism of the nineteenth century shaped one aspect of the intellectual content 
of Turkish secularism.
In this study, it is also intended to conceptualize secularity and to define its 
dimensions. Furthermore, the issues of Islam and secularity, and secular 
dimensions in the Ottoman classical age were discussed. According to the author, 
Turkish positivist secularism is related with both of these issues.
While doing so, this study attempted to consider Turkish secularism in the 
context of modernization problem.
I l l
ÖZET
v*'
Bu çalışma, Türk sekularizminin fikri alanın bir kısmını incelemektedir. 
Çalışmanın yazarına göre, 19.yüzyıl positivizmi Türk sekularizminin fikri 
boyutunun önemli bir kısmını biçimlendirmiştir.
Bu çalışma, laikliği (secularity) kavramsallaştırmaya çalışmıştır. Ayrıca, 
İslam ve laiklik, ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun klasik dönemindeki laik (secular) 
boyut da tartışılmıştır.
Bu çalışma, laikliği, modernleşme meselesi içinde düşünmektedir.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is an introduction to a very broad and complex issue. In particular, it 
focuses on one of the important aspects of the intellectual realm  of the 
transformation to secularity in Turkey. It aims to explain an aspect of the 
intellectual content of the Turkish secularism that is defined as an "ideology" to 
transform the society to secularity-which is a condition in which modem concepts 
and values replace religious ones. The main thesis of this study is that the 
intelligentsia/state élite who conducted a secularization programme in Turkey had 
subscribed to a positivist thought ( that will be elaborated in the third chapter). 
Essentially, this study is a broad literature review of the primary sources on the 
subject under investigation, and the goal is ordering and comparison of the existing 
literature. This study is aimed to provide the basis for my doctoral studies.
The study comprises the following main points:
1. In the first chapter, the concept of secularity is clarified. To do so, 
secularity is defined, approaches to secularization are provided, and secularism is 
differentiated from secularization. In this context, the relationship between 
secularism, modernization and the modernizing state élite or intelligentsia are 
discussed.
2. In the second chapter, the main aim is to investigate the secular dimension 
of the Ottoman Empire in its classical age, which is important for understanding 
Turkish secularism as it emerged as an ideology with the Young Turks. It is equally 
important to consider the issue of Islam and secularity, since this debate is veiy 
related to secularity in the Ottoman Empire in its classical age, and hence to Turkish 
secularism that will be elaborated later.
3. Third chapter focuses on positivism of the nineteenth centuiy and its 
impact on the Turkish secularist élite, and how that élite received the phenomenon 
of secularism.
Essentially, chapter 1 and chapter 2 form the background for the Turkish 
case discussed in chapter 3. We can see that in the study there is a continuity 
between chapters, since firstly the Turkish secularism cannot be understood without 
clarifying secularization process and secularism theoretically.
Secondly, Turkish secularism cannot also be understood without referring to 
the historical conditions that led to the secularity of the Ottoman Empire and to the 
Westernization attempts of the Ottoman élite. For example, Atatürk’s secularizing 
reforms which were the zenith of the secularist reforms show at least two facts 
which had antecedents in the Ottoman history, namely his opinions on the social 
roles of religion and the techniques which Atatürk used to transform his ideas into 
policy. His ideas on religion were marked with the impression of the empiricism of 
Ottoman secular bureaucracy, and the technique that he used to accomplish his 
ideas was suggested beforehand by the modernizing state élite.
Furthermore, it can be observed that the pragmatist-secular orientation of the 
Ottoman statesmen predisposed them to positivism. The philosophical brace of 
positivism, which is explained in the third chapter, was of course different from that 
underlying the views of the Ottoman state élite, but the pragmatism underlying the 
western European science presented a common ground for both. Therefore, the state 
élite in the 1900s can approach secularism-which was essential to reach the 
modernity-in the positivist mind. This trend climbed to its zenith in Atatürk’s period 
and could carry out its praxis in that era.
CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF
SECULARITY
The term secularity is not an easy concept to deal with. One of the reasons 
for this difficulty is that secularity is a multi-dimensional concept that paves the 
way to confusion.
Here, it may be useful to use Donald E. Smith’s conceptualization of 
secularization. Smith (1974a: 7-8) considers five analytically distinct aspects of 
secularization as follows:
1 .Polity- separation secularization
2.Polity-expansion secularization
3 .Political-culture secularization
4. Political-process secularization
5. Polity-dominance secularization
1.1. What is Secularitv?
Polity-separation secularization refers to the formal and institutional 
separation of religion and polity or state (church-state separation) and the refusal of 
the religious identity of the polity, i.e., non-recognition of a state religion or the 
religious character of the state (Smith, 1974a;8). This understanding of 
secularization goes back to “ the Peace of Westphalia” in 1648 (Schulze, 1994:51), 
“where it used to describe the transfer of territories previously under the 
ecclesiastical control to the dominion of lay political authorities” 
(Wilson,1987:159). We can observe this kind of secularization in many countries 
such as. Western and Latin American countries. However, in some secularization 
processes, polity-separation secularization cannot be found. The secularization
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model of Turkey and Russia are two good examples of this (Toprak, 1981:57; 
Pipes, 1974), since both Turkey and Russia (before the Soviet time) do not separate 
religion from the state formally.
The second aspect of secularization is polity-expansion secularization. It 
involves the expansion of the political system into areas of society formally 
regulated by religion. The polity extends its jurisdiction into the areas that have 
formerly been in the hands of religion, such as education, economy, and law. This 
process of secularization can be found in all around of the world, such as European, 
Latin American, and some Asian countries. We can encounter in the European 
secularization history that, since the Reformation, the secular polity has extended 
its jurisdiction into some spheres, such as education and law. Similarly, polity- 
expansion can be encountered in some non-European (and Western) countries such 
as Nepal, Burma, Turkey and Latin American countries that can be regarded as 
good examples of polity expansion secularization about which literature on 
secularization mentions. For example, legal reforms in Nepal constitute an 
important manifestation of polity-expansion secularization. In the Hindu 
religiopolitics "polity-expansion secularization is crucial, for it goes to the very 
heart of the system and replaces sacral societal norms and relationships with secular 
ones determined by government" (Smith,1974a:l 1; and Rose, 1974:39-42).
Another example is Burma. According to Fred Rvon der Mehden( 1974:64), 
Burma had gone through two major radical cases of polity expansion during the 
British occupation and the coup of 1962. In this period, the educational, social, and 
political functions of the Sangha (the Buddhist order of monks) were decreased.
Furthermore, we see an important example of the polity-expansion 
secularization in Latin America. In Latin America, polity-expansion secularization 
is the process by which the state consolidates its sovereignty at the expense of 
church structures in law, education, and other areas of social control. Through such
a secularization, the dominance of the Latin American Catholic church was mostly 
eroded (Mecham, 1966:137,214; Smith 1974b: 122-123).
The polital-culture or transvaluation secularization is the most difficult one 
to achieve. It refers to the "transformation of values, world-views associated with 
the polity; secular notions of political community, the legitimacy of the polity, and 
the meaning of politics replace traditional religious notions in the thinking of many 
people” (Smith, 1974a:8). In other words, through the polity-transvaluation 
secularization process, “traditional” culture with its “symbols” is tranformed. It is 
important to mention here that, there is a close relationship between culture and 
symbols. This relationship can be understood better with Geertz's definion of 
culture as common symbols (Toprak, 1981:40). Hence, this kind of secularity can 
also be called as “symbolic secularization” as Toprak did (1981). In addition, 
secularization of knowledge and that of minds of individuals should be considered 
within the transvalution secularization process. This secularization took place in 
Western Europe through the Reformation, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. 
In the non-western parts of the world, this kind of secularization is the most difficult 
and the slowest one. The cases of Soviet Union and Turkey to some extent 
(religious resurgents in the ex-Soviet Union and Turkey) indicate the difficulties of 
the process.
The fourth kind of secularization is "political-process secularization". It 
refers to the heavily decreasing of political saliency and authority of religious 
leaders, religious interest groups, religious political parties, and religious issues. 
The waning influence of religious political parties and their increasingly secular 
orientation would both be manifestations of political-process secularization (Smith, 
1974:8). In other words, in this process, overt political activity becomes 
increasingly secular, religious issues become marginal to politics, they clearly cease 
to be politically influential, and religious political parties decline. For example, in 
Latin America, religious issues in the nineteenth century were at the center of
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politics. However, in the twentieth century religion in politics became marginal 
(Smith, 1974b: 127).
The last one is polity-dominance secularization. It is exercised through 
radical secularist programs by revolutionary regimes that recognize no area or very 
little area of religious autonomy. Efforts of the revolutionary elite are to get rid of 
the social and political influence of religion or modify religion to bring it into line 
with official ideologies.
The process of polity-dominance secularization is one which the 
political system not only repudiates its traditional connections with 
religious institutions and takes over many of their functions of 
social control, but it goes on to secularize society by seeking to 
destroy or radically alter religion itself. Extreme methods of 
coercion are used by the government, for it is deemed necessary to 
secularize the political culture and political process rapidly. In 
polity- dominance secularization the religion system is left with 
little or no autonomy (Smith, 1974b: 128).
According to Smith (1974a: 8), polity-dominance secularization process is limited to 
a few historical examples. “The radical secularization attempts during certain 
phases of the French, Mexican, Russian and the Soviet, Turkish, and Chinese 
revolutions” can be considered major examples of this secularization (Smith 
1974a:8).
According to Smith (1974b: 128-9) and Cornelius and Craig (1988:430-431), 
the Mexican Revolution, and the governments that have acted in its name since 
1910, is a good example of polity-dominance secularization. The Mexican 
Revolution witnessed a severe anti-clericalism in the reform process that began in 
1855. The Reform process banned all the ecclesiastical courts, seized the church 
property, secularized law and education, and imposed heavy limitations on the 
church.
In addition, the Russian example of the polity-dominance secularization can 
be given. The secularization process in Russia in the periods of Peter the Great and 
his successors can be regarded as polity-dominance secularization. In that period the 
church came under the effective control of the government. Peter the Great 
inaugurated a radical change in the organization of the church. The church received 
a collegiate administration, the Holy Synod, similar to that of other major areas of 
the state administration. Consisting of a board of bishops, abbots, and marks, it also 
had, like the Senate, a High Procurator, a layman who eventually became the 
essential head of the ecclesiastical administration. Hence, the church was put under 
lay control totally.
Furthermore, the economic independence of the church came to an end in 
the period of Catherine II. A series of limited decrees culminated in the 
secularization of monastic and church lands in the Manifesto of 26 February 1764. 
Consequently, the Russian state could use the Orthodox Church as an instrument of 
political repression and control in an easier manner which eroded ethical and 
religious roles of the priests (Pipes, 1974:242).
In the Soviet time, the decree of 23 .lanuary 1918 declared all churches to 
separate from the educational system. By 1939 the Russian Orthodox Church had 
virtually ceased to exist as an institution. "Only about 2000 churches remained 
open, as compared with a prerevolutionany total of 46,000. Thousands of clergy and 
lay people were in the labor camps "(Walters, 1986:137-9).
In 1959, Krushchev started a severe antireligious campaign that lasted for 
five years. Around two-thirds of the churches then legally operating were closed 
down, and priests and believers arrested (Bourdeaux, 1970). And this kind of 
secularization was carried out in the first years of his leadership. The Communist 
party Congress in early 1986 affirmed the obligation of all party members "to carry 
out a decisive struggle with religious prejudices and other views and customs that 
are foreign to socialist way of life" (Dunlop, 1989:98-100). However, in the most
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severe of secularization period, the symbiotic identification of the church with state 
continued (O'Neil, 1993).
There are some criticisms directed against Smith’s typology. For example, 
Daniel Crecelius does not agree with his assertion that the dominance of the polity 
over religion and its institutions or structure in itself is a form of secularization. 
Crecelius (1974:90-91) argues:
It is not the institutional relationship between religion and state 
(whether or not the polity dominates the religious structure) that is 
important, nor even who introduces religious considerations into 
political debate, but the character of issues themselves that 
constitutes the essence of secularism. Secularism of necessity 
therefore demands the ability by the individual and the state to 
make that subtle psychological distinction between religion and 
politics, to be able to accept willingly a public sphere where 
rational, secular concepts and principles prevail-to be able, in 
short, to know "what to render unto Caesar and what to render unto 
God....(T)he absence of religious issues in political debate, the 
withdrawal of religious groups from the political arena, and the 
clear separation of religion and politics constitute the true essence 
of secularism.
However, Smith says, as a reply to Daniel Crecelius, "It can be objected that, 
since the state is still deeply involved in religious matters, this is really not 
secularization. However, the objective of the revolutionary regimes that have 
pursued this policy is the key factor; their aim is a secular society, even if the means 
involve extensive temporary intervention in religious matters" (Smith, 1974:1288). 
Crecelius’ argument does not reflect reality, because if the argument were true, 
there would not be any secular country in the world. Even in European countries, 
religion has a place in their cleavage structures and voter alignments (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967: 1-56).
All of the five processes of secularization aim at "the removal of the sacred 
canopy" above us, as Berger puts it (1967). However, some scholars object to this 
secularization theory (See Wallis and Bruce, 1992:11). All these complexities of the 
definition of secularization are related to the approaches of secularization and the 
definitions of religion that will be mentioned below.
1.2. Modernization and Approaches to Secularization
Arguments presented above are directly related to modernization debates, 
because secularization in its full sense is a part of modernization. This is expressed, 
for example, by Toprak (1981:6):
Not only the separation of church and state but the general 
transformation of traditional values, the emergence of national 
identity distinct from and superseding religious or communal 
identities, the transfer of the bases of political authority and 
legitimacy from the religio-communal to the secular, and the 
functional differentiation of social and political institutions are a 
set of complex phenomena which accompany the secularization 
process. Put differently, secularization, taken in this broad sense, is 
an important aspect of modernization.
This argument is also supported, among other scholars, by Daniel Lemer 
(1958) in his book The Passing o f  Traditional Society and by David C. McClelland 
in his The Achieving Society (Tumer, 1991:213).
However, there remain some further different ways to approach 
secularization. None of the approaches to secularization in the context of 
modernization object to the relationship between secularization and modernization, 
but they differ in respect to the definitions of secularization and religion in the 
context of modernization. There are mainly three approaches to secularization 
(Mert, 1992) in the modem sense (that is, secularization in its full sense, covering
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five secularization processes that were mentioned before) which we will see in the 
following sections.
1.2.L The Classical Modernization Theory and the Orthodox Approach to 
Secularity: Weber and Durkheim
The first approach, that is, the“orthodox approach”, derives mainly from the 
“fathers” of the Modernization theory, that is Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. It 
may be questionable to include Durkheim and Weber in the same category, but as 
Mert (1992) suggests, they can be viewed in the same group when their general 
approaches to the matter of religion and secularization are considered.*. Weber 
argues that religion is the Weltanschauung o f pre-modem/traditional societies. 
Hence, secularization, according to Weber, is an inevitable aspect of the 
modernization process. This is because, according to Weber, modernization of a 
society goes with "rationalization", and the rise of rationalization paves the way to 
the decline of religion (Mommsen, 1989:133-144). A "rational" human gets rid of 
any traditional norms. Weber thinks that modem society is as rational as a machine 
or computer (Turner, 1991:201).
Furthermore, following F. Schiller's words, Weber puts forward a condition 
for a modem society: disenchanment By this term, Weber means human's 
emancipation from the sacred world of magic. Essentially, there exist no 
supernatural or mysterious forces that cannot be identified. There is no need then 
for the kind of magical power that is an essential part of traditional societies (Gerth 
and Minis, 1961:139). In other words, disenchanment means freeing nature from 
religious overtones, and this involves the dispelling of animistic spirit and gods and 
magic from the natural world, separating it from God and distinguishing human
' o f  course, Weber and Durkheim generally contrived totally different theories on hunian/social 
phenomena. For the differences between Weber and Durkheim, see, (Mert, 1992:14). Here, the similarity is 
on the approach to the matter o f ‘secularization and religion.’
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beings from it, so that humans may no longer regard nature as a divine entity, which 
thus allows them to act freely upon nature, to make use of it according to their 
needs and plans, and hence create historical change and 'development' (Turner, 
1991:201-2).
In Durkheim’s view religion is a dominant characteristics of a certain type 
of society-homogenous traditional societies. In other words, for Durkheim, religion 
and tradition go hand in hand. For this reason, one cannot be separated from the 
other. According to the Durkheimian theory “The decline of traditional society 
means the inevitable decline of religion. Accordingly, secularization is defined as 
the decline of religion rather than the separation of spheres. The place of religion is 
replaced by science and rational order on the one hand and social differentiation on 
the other, in modem society, and these are also inseparable aspects of modem 
society, which constitute a coherent whole” (Mert,1992:12).
Thus, it can be observed that although Weber and Durkheim put forward 
totally distinct theories on social phenomena, a similar “holistic definition of 
religion exists” in both of these founders of the classical modernization theory, that 
is, “both consider religion as the correspondent of certain social system and hence 
an inseparable aspect of social and individual life” (Mert, 1992: 3,13). In other 
words, religion and modernity are depicted as meaning systems, and secularization 
is viewed as the encounter between these two different meaning systems. This is 
also expressed by Wallis and Bmce (1989:493) below:
Whatever the differences in their approach to religion... Durkheim 
and Weber all foresaw a major decline in its role in the modem 
world. Religion's ability to provide a single, integrated and 
generally held conception of meaning had been fatally eroded by 
the emergence of a plurality of life experience deriving from 
widely differing relationships to a rapidly changing social order, by 
the increasing rationalistic organization of an industrialized, mass- 
market economy, and by more universalistic conception of 
citizenship.
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The classical modernization and secularization theory was criticized heavily by the 
revisionist approach to secularization. There are two main sources of this approach. 
One is the sociology of Parsons, and the other is the "desecularization" process or 
the "revitalization of religion" in the 1960s (Mert, 1994:87-8).
1.2.2. The Revisionist Approach to Secularization
Essentially, the revisionist approach to secularization comes with the revisionist 
approach to modernization. Scholars generally criticize the unidirectional, universal 
and irreversible characteristics of the classic notion of modernity and its strict 
traditional-modern separation (Leys, 1982:332-349;Davis, 1987:221-280). In that 
context, .loseph R. Gusfield (1971:49-59) criticizes the theory and mentioned its 
seven major faulty principles of the classical modernization theory. These are as 
following: underdeveloped societies are static societies; traditional culture is a 
totality of coherent norms; traditional societies have a monolithic social structure; 
the traditional values and norms of a modernizing society are substituted by modern 
values and norms within a modernization process; traditional and modern values, 
norms, cultures, styles of life, minds always confront each other; traditionality and 
modernity always reject each other; and modernization process always weakens 
tradition.
In a similar manner, the revisionist approach to secularization criticizes the 
classical or orthodox approach to secularization and modernization. The scholars in 
this paradigm mainly criticize some principal tenets of the classical secularization 
theory that are common with the modernization theory, such as holistic, unilinear 
and irreversible characteristics of the secularization theory, its strict and naive 
differentiation of modem and traditional, and its definition of religion and
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secularization. In this context, the most influential critiques come from M. Hill, K. 
Dobbelaere, D. Martin, C.G.Brown, R.K.Fenn, K.Mendhunds, and P. E. Glasner.
According to M. Hill (1976:passim), following Parson's sociology, social 
differentiation, which is an important characteristics of a modem society, does not 
necessarily pave the way to the decline of religion.
Furthermore, Dobbelaere (1981:5-6,15-22, 35-95) criticizes the classical 
theory's identification of religion with its institutional characteristics and the 
absolute acceptance of its decline as the decline of church attendance. In addition, 
he also criticizes the unilinear, universal and absolutely inexorable characters of 
“the general theory of secularization.” In that respect, he argues that "the general 
theory o f secularization" is a "mechanical" one “when the process of rationalization 
and Vergesellschaftung {s,oci2\\z 2ii\ovL) are at issue” (Mert, 1992:15).
Also, Martin criticizes the classical theory of secularization. According to 
him, the classical secularization theory has three main faulty assumptions. These are 
as follows:
1 .secular universalism,
2. the role of the notion of key stratum, and
3. the historical baseline.
He argues that first “incompatibility of religion with modernization” should be 
questioned, secondly, the role of secularizing élite should not be overemphasized. 
Thirdly he points to the problem of the "golden age" (the historical existence of a 
baseline-religious society). For Martin, some characteristics of Catholicism 
dominate the understanding of religion of the classical theory. These characteristics 
were “the temporal power of the church, asceticisms, and ecclesiastical dominance 
in the spheres of artistic patronage and learning". Martin puts forward that if 
religion is considered in terms of these characteristics, it can be possible to observe 
several secularization processes in Christianity in its past, even before the industrial 
revolution. In addition, Martin argues that there are many shortcomings of the
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classical theory vis-a-vis the religious resurgence and desecuralization in 
modem/industrialized societies (Mert,1992:17-18).
Brown (1992:32) argues that the classical secularization theory is deficient 
both as an explanation of the available evidence on the growth and decline of 
religion at least in "the world's first two industrial-urban nations -Britain and USA".
Glasner (1972:2) objects to the classical theory in his book The Sociology o f  
Secularization. According to him, the classical definitions of religion and 
secularization in the classical modernization/secularization theory should be thought 
as "scientific myth" since it is “based upon that element that isolates a particular 
relationship between variables to the exclusion of others." For Glasner, "the 
historical existence of a baseline society" (the Golden age), "the possibility of 
religious homogeneity" in a society, and the "identification of religion with its 
institutional aspect" constitute the main assumptions of the classical theoiy 
(Mert, 1992:19-20). According to him, the historical existence of a golden age is 
evolutionary-historicist (in the Popperian sense)", and idealizing any period as being 
the time of faith will not be true, for example rationalism and humanism existed 
during the middle ages (Baykan, 1995:245). Furthermore, the argument of the 
classical modemization/secularization theory, that is, the decline of religion with the 
rising of modernity, for Glasner, reckons religion in a “narrow” and “unrealistic” 
manner. He argues that the legend of the decline of religion in reality does not have 
a meaning of decline of religion itself, since religion (in its institutional meaning) is 
not the same with religiousness. Hence, the decline of religion institutionally does 
not mean the decline of religiousness, since religiousness is pertinent for 
interpersonal relationships (Mert, 1992:21).
“"I mean by 'historicism' an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their 
principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms’ or the 'patterns', 
the 'laws’ or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of histoiy." Karl R. Popper, The P overty o f  
H istoricism , (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1957), p.3.
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In addition, in the view of Glasner, in the absence of "differentiation" in 
traditional societies in terms of social institutions, these traditional societies are 
defined as religious, because religion is a key actor to carry out many social 
functions. However, the process of modernization created differentiation in 
societies. This institutional and organizational differentiation of modem societies 
substitutes religious institutions. However, this replacement does not mean the so- 
called decline of religion totally, because this decline is restricted to the institutional 
aspect of religion. Religion in interpersonal relationships or religiousness, according 
to Glasner, in fact, has not declined (Mert, 1992:19-21). But in the modernization 
process, religion may change, even though, according to the revisionist, it does not 
totally decline .
In that context, R. Bellah's (1971) conceptualization of "civil religion"  ^ and 
R. Towler's (1975) conceptualization of "common religion" deseiwe attention. 
According to Bellah, secularization in the modern world takes place in the context 
of corporate goals and values, but interpersonal values or individual religiousness 
continue to be sacred. This religion is called as "civil religion" or "common 
religion", since it is not regulated by any religious institution. So, religion continues 
to exist in the private part of social reality, but not in the public realm.
To sum up, scholars who are regarded as "revisionists", with some
t
differences, all criticize some characteristics of the orthodox or classical 
understanding of religion and secularization, such as historicism, unilinearism, and 
universalism. In that context, Cox's words are meaningful:
What I object to is the air of inevitability which results from 
wrapping all of these changes up unto a package called 'the process 
of secularization' and using that package as an explanation of 
social change in the modem world (Cox, 1982:15-16).
^Bellah considered “civil religion” as an instrument wliich American society unified by. This religion 
would not be in conflict with plurality and differentiation. (A. Coşkun, "Modern Toplumsal Düşünce 
Tarihinde Din Sorunu", B ilg i ve Hikmet, no;9, Winter 1995, p.45).
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Furthermore, the revisionists do not accept the “narrow understanding of religion” 
in terms of its institution, and reject the definition of secularization that bases upon 
the classical definition of religion. They also question some principal tenets of the 
classical theory, such as "homogeneity" and "coherence" of “traditional” societies 
and their religious beliefs, and the inability to exist in harmony of religion with 
modernity that make necessary the refusal of plurality in the societies. In addition, 
for the revisionist theory, the idea of the parcellized and plural nature of human 
being and social reality is very important to redefine religion and secularity (Brown, 
1992:55-6). For example, Berger (1967:134) puts:
In other words, insofar as religion is common it lacks "reality", and 
insofar as it is "real" it lacks commonality. This situation 
represents a severe rupture of the traditional task of religion, which 
was precisely the establishment of an integrated set of definitions 
of reality that could serve as a common universe of meaning for 
the members of a society. The world-building potency of religion 
is thus restricted to the construction of sub-worlds of fragmented 
universes of meaning.
1.2.3.Criticism of the Revisionist Approach to Secularization
As mentioned above, the revisionist approach criticizes the classical secularization 
theory and constructs new concepts to explain the social reality better. However, 
though some of the critiques of the modernization theory can be accepted, some of 
the critiques and concepts developed by the revisionist approach have been 
criticized by some scholars. The views of the scholars that will be mentioned here 
can be said to represent a third view. They may be called as neo-classicists due to 
their views on religion and secularization that will be mentioned below.
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First, the definition of religion of the revisionists has some problems. 
According to R. Wallis and S. Bruce (1992:9-10), this kind of definition (functional 
definition) has at least five main problems:
First, functional definitions count as religious things that on the 
face of it do not look very religious (political ideologies or secular 
therapies, for example) and that are typically regarded as secular 
by their adherents. Secondly, it is not at all clear just what is an 
'ultimate' question or in whose mind it is ultimate. Proponents of 
such an approach often fall back on the examination of beliefs and 
institutions which are conceived as religious in some other, 
substantive sense and the phenomenon they describe seems at 
times to have little to do with issues of 'ultimacy'. Thirdly, while 
we readily concede the value of exploring similarities between 
religious institutions and other patterns of behavior that at times 
seem to serve similar purposes, calling them all religious gains 
very little except some contentious theoretical baggage and loses 
much analytical clarity. A legitimate interest in explaining 
'functional' equivalents of religion can be pursued as readily with a 
substantive definition of religion as with a functional one. 
Fourthly, the functional definition involves the danger of 
inappropriately establishing by definition what needs to be argued 
for and demonstrated that this or that is indeed the functional 
equivalent of religion. Finally, a functional definition has the 
disadvantage of foreclosing on the issue which interested us in this 
volume of essays.
In other words, where religion is defined functionally, wide variety of ideologies 
(even secular ones), “activities, science, mass entertainment, mass rallies, etc., that 
have no reference to the supernatural, to monality, faith, destiny, ultimate meaning, 
or final purposes may be held to be religion” (Wilson,1987:159-160). Hence, we 
can obseiwe that functional-broader-definition of religion does mean a narrower 
content of religion. This means to be far away from the social reality of religion. 
Furthermore, the revisionist definition of religion represents one of various.
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parcellized life spheres, in each of which an individual is supposed to play different 
roles.
The substantive definition of religion seems to have more truth. Religion in 
that context consists of actions, beliefs, orientations, and structures considered with 
the assumption of the existence of either supernatural entities with powers of 
agency, as impersonal powers or process possessed of moral purpose, which have 
the capacity to set the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs (Wallis and 
Bruce; 1992,10-1 l;W ilsonl987:159). The very important characteristics of this 
definition is its being a world-view. According to Mert (1992:32) and Nortboume 
(1995:14) if social reality is considered in coherence, and if religion is considered as 
coherent, modern view is not compatible with religion. Mert argues that "modem 
understanding of life, which is dominated by rational-practical concerns, the idea of 
the impersonal nature of relations, future orientation, and the rejection of the 
supernatural cannot be reconciled with the religious view which is based on an 
opposite set of values."
In that context, Bellah and Towler put forward "common" or "civil" religion 
to indicate the implicit unsecularized religion. According to Wallis and 
Bruce( 1992:21), these concepts are an amorphous category, the more so because 
they cannot be totally distinguished from "official religion", since they also involve
f
the adaptation or utilization of official religious beliefs and practices in unofficial 
ways.
Secondly, the revisionist approach negates any "age of faith". In other words, 
according to the revisionists religion never dominated the minds of people in 
general during the medieval times (See Goodridge,1975). Although historical record 
is not unambiguous (Schulze, 1994:55) on the matter, Wallis and Bmce (1992:25) 
argue that nothing in their extensive reading of the histoiy of religion and of studies 
of present-day 'implicit' religion leaded them (or many other people) to doubt that 
there had been a major change in the importance and popularity of religion and that
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the term 'secularization' was as good a way of describing it as any other. This reality 
is expressed by Albert Bayet (1991:passim) and others (Kili9bay, 1994:15-17; 
Michel, 1994:103-4; Nortboume, 1995:48).
Lastly, the revisionist approach argues strongly that the secularization theory 
cannot explain the growth of ‘religionization’ and ‘desecularization’ in modernized 
societies (Brown, 1992:31). As a response to the revisionists, scholars such as 
Wilson (1988:46) developed a concept: ‘Internal secularization’^ *. This is a state in 
which the paradigms of modernity determine religious discourses through changing 
of the content of religion with modem concepts, “such as the replacement of the 
religious emphasis on stability, authenticity and dogma by a modem emphasis on 
change, novelty, and relativism” (Mert, 1992:35).
In this study, I will use ‘secularization’ in accordance with the classical 
definition, as stated above.
1.3. Secularization. Secularism. Laicization. Laicism
Secularization is not the same as secularism. This distinction is important. 
Secularization, according to the classical definition mentioned before that I prefer, 
relates essentially to a process of decline in religious activities, beliefs, ways of 
thinking, and institutions that occurs primarily in association with, or as an 
unconscious or unintended consequence of, other processes of social structural 
change. On the other hand, secularism is an ideology that “aims to denounce all 
forms o f supematuralism and agencies devoted to it, advocate nonreligious, 
antireligious, or anti-clerical principles as the basis for personal morality and social 
organization” (Wilson, 1987:159). Secularism, in short, aims to establish a secular 
society. Therefore, in a secularist view, the ultimate structure of the society is
”*For an interesting “internal secularization” approach see, Nuray Mert, “İslamcı Sekülarizm”, Dergah, July 
1995, vol:VI, no:65, N. Mert, “ İslamcılık Yoluyla Gelen Sekülerleşme, Devletin Laiklik Dayatmasına 
İhtiyaç Bırakmayacak”, Matbuat, no: 13, May 1995, and Göle (1994: 130).
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determined. In other words, secularism submits a closed Weltanschauung. This is 
expressed by H. Cox in his book The Secular City. According him (1965:21), 
whereas secularization implies a continuing and open-ended process in which 
values and world views are continually revised in accordance with evolutionary 
change in history, secularism, like religion, projects a closed world-view and an 
absolute set of values in line with an ultimate historical purpose having a final 
significance for human beings.
Secularism sometimes expresses a strong hostility to religion. This kind of 
secularism is known as “radical” or “Jacobian” secularism. It leads to some 
problems in society. For example, according to Abel (1995:38), secularism in that 
context destroys its base that is pluralism. Secularism both takes the social role of 
religion upon itself, that is, it transforms to an ideological state apparatus, and 
substitutes for religion, and this secularism can become a "civil" religion. According 
to Abel (1995:29-30), if secularism becomes a religion, secularism itself should be 
secularized.
A similar view comes from Thomas Michel, S.J., who is the Councillor of 
the Papacy of the Dialog between religions. According to Michel (1994:102), when 
secularization is considered as a political and intellectual project, and it becomes 
basis of a whole world-view and an ideology that opposes any role of religious 
beliefs or institutions in human and social life, it is then referred to as “secularism”. 
For Michel, this is not indifference to religion, but a total opposition to it. People 
who support secularism regard religion as the root of fanaticism, a barrier against 
development, opium and a human weakness that should be destroyed.
Some scholars differentiate between secularization and laicization. 
According to Wilson (1987:160), laicization "refers specifically to the abrogation of 
priestly offices and functions or the transfer of certain functions such as judicial 
roles, teaching and social work, to specialists for whom theological qualifications 
are no longer deemed necessary or appropriate. Laicization refers also to the
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disavowal of the explicitly sacerdotal claims of religious professionals". Therefore, 
laicization in this meaning can be considered as an aspect of secularization that was 
explained above.
Lastly, although some scholars, such as Ateş (1994) differentiate secularism 
from laicism  by arguing that laicism  does not take into consideration the polity- 
separation secularization, in my opinion there are unimportant nuances between 
these two terms, so much so that these two terms can be used interchangeably. This 
fact is also expressed by Berkes (1964:5): “While the underlying emphasis in the 
word ‘secularism’ is on the idea of worldliness, the term laicism  emphasizes the 
same thing. They were used in connection with the problems of duality opposition, 
or separation of church and state”.
1.4.Modemization. Secularization. Modernizing and Secularizing Intelligentsia or 
State Elite
According to the modernization theory, passing to modernity and secularity that 
took place in Western society^ lasted at least four centuries with its own dynamics 
(Kautsky, 1972:passim). However, since non-western societies could not realize 
such a modernity and secularity, these "underdeveloped" traditional non-western 
societies must realize modernity and secularity in a very short time. Hence, an 
intelligentsia is needed to accelerate the "static" history of the traditional societies to 
reach modernity - secularity (Shils, 1968:18-24).
The modernizing and secularizing intelligentsia can carry out its modem and 
secularizing ideologies in an authoritarian or totalitarian manner, generally in a 
single party authority. This modernizing single party regime can be further
^Four fundamental historical roots can be attributed to the rise o f Western secularity. These are pre- 
Christian beliefs, such as the dualism of reason and relevetion (see, Davutoglu, 1994:11-34), the 
characteristics o f Judeo-Christian religion (Berger, 1967), the Renaissance, the Reformation movements 
and the Enlightenment and secularization o f kowledge and life (Davutoglu, 1994:34-45; Capra, 1992:53- 
265), and the commercial and the industrial revolutions (See, M^^dhurst and Mayser,1988).
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totalitarian or authoritarian. We can talk about a totalitarian regime, if the regime is 
"utopian" and wants to transform a society radically, and if there is a partial 
transformation for modernization, it may be called as authoritarian (Linz, 
1984:131). This difference between totalitarianism and authoritarianism in terms of 
“utopia” is very important for the severity of transformation of “traditional” 
societies. In other words, advocating totalitarianism, “utopic” intelligentsia in 
Mannheim’s understanding carries out more radical secularism, compared with 
“ideological” intelligentsia who prefers authoritarian regime to totalitarian regime 
(Mannheim, 1976:passim).
1.5. Secularity and Political Thought
In the Western pre-modem political thought, we can observe mainly three different 
views on the relationship between state and religion which is a very important part 
of secularity.
The first view is theocracy. This view comes from some priests- 
theoreticians, such as Luther, Calvin, and Bossuet. According to them, the state 
does not have an independent entity or institution from the church. In other words, 
the state is an entity or institution established through the norms or principles 
originated from the church or religion. Due to this vital connection with the .church, 
the state can exist only if the connection with the church exists. That is to say, 
church and state are an organic whole. State is a church-state. So, ruler or king is a 
reflection of God. Therefore, resisting to the ruler means to deny God.
The second group may be called liberal, since they put forward the full 
separation of state and church. Locke and Tocqueville represent this group. 
According to them, the separation between state and church is necessary for 
democracy.
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The third view puts forward the superiority of polity to religion. Religion 
should be dependent upon "polity". Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu and 
Rousseau can be regarded in the third group. Although these thinkers' inspirations 
were not divine, they could perceive the power of religion as an instrument of the 
state. For example, Machiavelli denied the politics that had to adapt itself to orders 
and requirements of the Medieval Christianity, and he wanted full independency of 
the state. For this reason, according to Machiavelli, the state should get rid of the 
Christian orders preaching passivity and ordinaries. However, according to 
Machiavelli the state should connect to religion, and the state should exploit 
religion. Machiavelli thought that the majesty of the Great Roman Empire and its 
political power were due to the exploitation of religion by the state. For example. 
Emperor Numa Pompilius had exploited religion so as to realize the obedience of 
the people. Similarly, Hobbes, by giving examples from the Jews and the Ancient 
Rome, talks in his book the Levithan about religion as an important element of 
politics and a means to direct the church. His conclusion is very clear: Like a 
human being, state needs a religion, and state should direct religion. State should 
transform religion to a social law. According to Hobbes, there should be a fusion 
between state and religion. Furthermore, Rousseau puts forward a "civil religion" 
that depends upon the state (Vergin, 1994:5-23).
1.6. Conclusion
This chapter aimed to discuss some important points on the dimensions of 
secLilarity. First, it explained the concept of secularization with its five dimensions. 
In my opinion, this definition of secularization is effective to deal with most of the 
difficulties of the concept, since it explains secularization in a broad manner.
Furthermore, the chapter explained some approaches to secularization. The 
orthodox theory of secularization that is represented by Durkheim and Weber tends
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to define secularization as the decline of religion in all aspects at the individual and 
societal levels due to the rise of modernity. This understanding has been with some 
modification, continued by Wilson and others that may be called as neo-classicists. 
However, some recent studies on the matter have criticized the orthodox model that 
I stated before. For this revisionist approach, secularization means the adaptation of 
religion to modernity and its suiwival under modern pluralistic conditions. However, 
there are some important shortcomings of this critical view especially on the 
definition of religion that is mentioned above. In this study, secularization is used as 
the decline of religious authority vis a vis modernity instead of the adaptation of 
religion to modernity.
Secularism that is differentiated from secularization is also important to 
elaborate, since it is very related especially with non-western and “traditional” 
societies as an ideology to transform society from a traditional to a modem one. In 
that context, we should think secularization process and secularism in the context of 
the modernity problem, and explain these in the context of modernism that I tried to 
do. In that context, modernizing intelligentsia should be understood as secularizing 
intelligentsia, since it considers seculararization as an unseparable dimension of 
modernity.
It is further seen in the chapter that there are mainly three approaches to 
secularity as the separation of state and religion (church) in the premodem Western 
political thought namely, the theocratic view, the liberal view, and the view that 
puts forward the superiority of polity to religion.
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CHAPTER TWO:
ISLAM AND SECULARITY 
AND
SECULARITY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
IN ITS CLASSICAL AGE (1300-1600)
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Turkey is the legal successor of the Ottoman State, and the secular Turkey is in fact 
a product of the Ottoman modernization. Notwithstanding some political rupture in 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic, we can observe an ideological and 
cultural continuity between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire*’. This reality was 
lastly mentioned by Erich Zürcher (1995). We must also be informed about the 
historical characteristics of the classical Ottoman politics upon which the Ottoman 
modernization and secularism were based. In other words, in order to understand 
better the Turkish secularism that started in around 1900s, we must understand the 
historical characteristics of the Ottoman State before the modernization attempts.
Islam had an important place in the Ottoman Empire. This is an indisputable 
fact. However, the place of Islam in the state affairs, and whether the Ottoman 
Empire was governed in accordance with religious principles are controversial. 
Although some authors have argued that the Ottoman Empire had been governed in 
the classical age in accordance with the “Islamic principles” (hence, they have 
argued that the Ottoman Empire was a theocracy), I will try to show that in the 
empire there was some kind of secularity in the state affairs in its classical age. 
However, it is important that my argument does not mean that the Ottoman Empire 
was 'secular' in the fullest sense of the concept, since such an argument, as Arkoun 
(1995:70) says, will be anachronistic.
2.1 .Introduction
^Essentially, Ottoman influence can be obseived not only in the Turkish Republic but also in some of its 
successor states in the Middle East. For this, see Erguii Ozbuduii, “The Continuing Legacy and The State 
Tradition in Tlie Middle East”. In The Ottoman Legacy. Edited by L. C. Brown (New York: Columbia 
University Press, forthcoming), and M odernization In The M iddle East-The Ottoman Empire and Its 
Afro-Asian Successors. Edited by C. E. Black and L. C. Brown (Princeton: The DaiAvin Press, Inc., 1992).
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The debates of secularity in the Ottoman Empire (and the Turkish Republic) 
are very related with the characteristics of Islam’ and the debate of “Islam and 
secularity” that will be explained below. Hence, before turning to the Turkish case, 
it will be useful to elaborate on the issue of Islam and secularity.
2.2. Islam and Secularity
The problem of Islam and secularity or secularization of Islam or Islamic secularism 
has been debated for a long time. The debates generally start with distinguishing 
the characteristics of Islam. Here, I am going to give Smith’s classification of 
religion to show the characteristics of Islam. Smith (1974a:6-7) categorizes Islam 
and Hinduism as ‘organic’ and, Christianity and Buddhism as ‘church systems’. For 
Smith, organic system tends to equate religion and society; sacral law and social 
structure are at the heart of religion. For example, for Smith the essential nature of 
traditional Hinduism and Islam is found in the caste system and 57ia//7a-sacral law, 
respectively, mechanisms by which entire societies were integrated by divine 
regulation. On the other hand, the main characteristics of the church system are 
found in the church: the Sangha (the Buddhist order of monks) and the Ecclesia 
(assembly of Christianity). It is important to mention that both the Sangha and the 
Ecclesia are set apart from the general society.
According to Smith, the church systems, due to the developed ecclesiastical 
organization, have better responded to the problem originating from secularization 
process through formulating or reformulating their social doctrine and fining it the 
stamp of ecclesiastical authority.
’ Here I want to say that the content o f secularization o f Islam is not so different from the Western case. As 
Mert (1992) argues, secularization as a decline o f religious authority and the increasing holdings o f  
modernity is mainly the same process in both Islamic and Christian countries with different contexts and 
styles.
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Organic systems, on the other hand, due to their low level of ecclesiastical 
organization, respond much less coherently and effectively; laypeople must 
undertake many of the tasks of resisting secularization, organizing political forces, 
and reformulating social doctrine. For Smith, the raison d’etre of the church is 
completely separable from the functions of public control. He states (1974a:6-7):
While a church can reach out to dominate the entire society (both 
Catholic and Buddhist churches have done it) the church continues 
to make sense religiously when the processes of secularization 
have stripped it of all its regulatory powers over society. The same 
processes however, leave the organic system in considerable 
difficulty. Hinduism without a sacral social order, or Islam without 
an operational sacral law faces a more fundamental problem of 
redefinition and with much weaker organizational mechanism to 
attempt the redefinition.
In brief, secularization process is more difficult in Islamic countries than a 
Christian country due to the facts mentioned above. This reality is expressed by 
Berkes (1964: 4):
Islam cannot be merely a faith for the conscience of the individual, 
that is, on the contrary, religion is so fused to every social 
institution that the existence of any one is endangered by the 
attempt to separate it from religion Islam.
If we accept the first meaning of secularity, that is polity-separation secularization, 
and accept secularity as the separation of state and religion, we can observe that 
there are great debates on the issue of secularity and Islam.
We can talk about three general views on the matter of the separation of 
religion and state in Islam. These are the proponents of a religious-Islamic model or 
God’s full sovereignty, proponents of a secularist model, and a third view.
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There are historical and modern proponents of this view. Ibn Taymiyya (1263- 
1328), for example, accepts that absolute sovereignty belongs only to God. The 
separation of religion and state cannot be imagined (Bannerman, 1988:668). 
Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun argues, in his famous Muqaddima, Vol.3, chapter 25 (Ibn 
Khaldun, 1988:101-113) as follows:
(No) state can establish itself and consolidate its control without... 
laws. If these laws are laid down by men of intelligence and 
insight, the polity is founded on reason (and subserves the 
temporal well-being of the subjects). But if they are laid down by 
God and promulgated by an inspired Lawgiver, the polity is 
founded on religion and is beneficial both for this and the 
next....Furthermore, that state whose law is based upon rational 
statecraft and its principles, but lacks the supervision of the 
Revealed Law is likewise blameworthy, since it is the product of 
speculation without the light of God. For the Lawgiver knows best 
the interests of men in all that relates to the other world, which is 
concealed from them.... Political government induces the people to 
conform to the dictates of reason for the promotion of worldly 
interests and the warding off of evils (Ibn Khaldun, cited in Gibb, 
1955:5)".
In modern times, Mawdudi, Hassan al-Turabi, and Sayyid Qutb advocate for the 
full sovereignty of God. According to Mawdudi (1967:53), the religious law 
(Shari’a) is a complete scheme of social order where nothing is superfluous and 
nothing lacking. The shari’a is also an organic and integrated whole whose many 
aspects and provisions all flow logically and ineluctably from the same basic 
principles. The organic and all embracing nature of the divine law, Mawdudi
2.2.1. Proponents of God’s Full Sovereignty
**For other classical and modem Islamic political thought, see Huriye Tevfik Miicahid, Farabi’den 
A bduh’a S iyasi Düşünce, Translated from Arabic by Vecdi Akyüz, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1995), for Ibn 
Khaldun, in the context above, see, Ibn Khaldun and Islam ic Ideology. Edited by B. B. Lawrance, 
(Leiden: E. .1. Brill, 1984).
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believes, has been forgotten or neglected by Muslims for most of their history since 
the time of the Rightly Guided Calipha. What is presently known as Islamic law, he 
says, is only part of the larger whole. It has no independent existence and can 
neither be understood apart from the total system to which it belongs 
(Mawdudi, 1967:57).
This understanding of the law (shari’a) implies that Islam does not recognize 
any division between religion and other aspects of life (Mawdudi, 1967:165), and 
most specifically between religion and the state. Secularity, for Mawdudi, is very 
contrary to Islam since it opens the way to exclusion of all morality, ethics or 
human decency from the controlling mechanism in society. This, he thinks , is what 
has happened in the Western world. According to Mawdudi, when religion is taken 
to the personal, private realm, individuals eventually yield to their “bestial impulse” 
and commit “evil” upon one another. It is because individuals wish to escape from 
the constraints of morality and the divine supervision that humans promote 
secularism (Adams, 1983:113-4).
According to Sarbonne-trained Hassan al-Turabi (1983:241) "the division 
between private and public, the state and society, that is familiar in Western culture, 
has not been known in Islam. The state is only the political expression of an Islamic 
society". For Turabi (1983:242), the ideological base of Islam is tawhid-the unity of 
God and human life. This belief of Tawhid (unity) has some consequences. 
According to him.
The Christian West has been through an important historical 
experience of secularization. There has also been certain elements 
of secularization in the political conduct of Muslims. But the 
difference between Christianity and Islam is that Muslims are 
never fully resigned to such practices because the preserved 
sources of religious guidance (the Quran and the example of the 
Prophet) constantly remind them of any gap that develops between 
their ideal and their practice and inspire a process of revitalization 
that would completely integrate politics with religion. If one
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compares Christian secularism in France with Muslim secularism 
in Turkey the process would seem strikingly similar. All religious 
life is subject to these historical challenges to their identity. But 
once the Muslims experience the tension of an historical fall and 
become conscious of the fact that public life has moved away 
from the moral values and norms of religion, they rise to reform 
their political attitude and institutions.
Furthermore, according to Muhammed Iqbal, founder of Pakistan, Islam is 
organically related to the social order, hence separation of Islam from social order, 
or the rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other 
(Esposito, 1983:184). A similar view exists in Sayyid Qutb's thought. According to 
him'^ , the main aims of Muslims should be to destroy the "human-dominated" 
world, and to set up the "God's country", destroying all systems made by humans, 
and establishing "the God's system" (Paçacı, 1994:186).
Lastly, according to the Islamic jurist Yusuf al-Kardawi (1994:131 and 
passim), it is imposible to compromise secularity with Islam, and at least at the four 
areas (the areas of íúi\i-akida, worship, morals, and law) in which Islam and 
secularity confront.
2.2.2. Proponents of a Secular Model
Contrary to those who demand that Shari'a should be the total and comprehensive 
law of the land, some Muslim scholars advocate for secularity and secular state. 
One of the important thinkers who advocates secularity is Ali abd al-Raziq in his 
short but effective book: Al-Islam Wa Usui Al-Hukm. He argues that there is no 
Islamic authority for the concept of caliphate in the classical sense.
^For a recent evaluation o f Sayyid Qutb, see, Shahrough Akhavi, “ Sayyid Qutb: The Poverty o f  
Philosophy and the Vindication o f Islamic Tradition”. In Cultural Transitions in the M iddle E ast Edited 
by Şerif Mardin, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994.
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Furthermore, according to al-Raziq, Islam has no political component and 
that the Prophet was a purely religious and spiritual and not a political leader. He 
was only a “prophet”. Moreover, he puts forward that the Prophet cannot be 
succeeded in his religious authority, which was terminated by the death of the 
Prophet (Abd al-Raziq, 1995:36-8, 52, 70-75, 80-94)*°.
Thus, al-Raziq not only argues for the establishment of a secular state, but 
he also maintains that the "Islamic" state was indeed, and from the beginning, 
secular and not religious. “The obvious implication of this thesis was that modem 
Muslim societies were completely free to organize their government in whatever 
manner they deemed fit and appropriate to their circumstances"(An-Naim, 1990:43).
Furthermore, some modem Muslim scholars have been trying to secularize 
Islam through using some Islamic-methodological concepts, such as îstihsan and 
istislah^' (Esposito, 1980:241-2; Köprülü, 1983:34). In addition, some authors in 
the Muslim world argue that the Sufi Islam evidences a secular tendency insofar as 
it emphasizes inwardness {Batiniyye) in religiosity. For example, some Turkish 
scholars, such as A. K. Bilgeseven, believes in such a Sufi secularity in Islam. 
(Bilgeseven, 1994:85; Kurtkan,1977:167-218; Temren, 1995:107). Furthermore, 
according to Bassam Tibi (1988:121) "secularization does not mean the abrogation 
of religion, because in a functionally differentiated system religion merely takes on 
social significance of a different nature and thus maintains meaning." Hence, we see 
that Tibi approaches secularization from the second-revisionist view that is stated 
before.
*°See, Ira M. Lapidus, “The Separation o f State and Religion in the Development o f Early Islamic 
Society”, International Journal o f  M iddle East Studies^ 6 (1975), pp.363-385.
^^Isfihsan is “legal discretion, preference. This is a source of law additional to the usual quarter o f Qu’ran, 
Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas, particularly liked by the Hanafis.” Istislah is to take into account “ the public 
good”. This is a “supplemanteraiy principle of Islamic law particularly liked by the Malikis. Istislah in 
theory and effect seeks to discover the maşlaha (which may be translated here as ‘public welfare’)”. Ian 
Richard Netton, A Popular D ictionary o f  Islam, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanities Press International 
Inc., 1992) pp. 130.See also, A. Şener, Kıyas, Îstihsan, istislah, (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri, n.d.).
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Lastly, some Muslim scholars do not negate secularity on the ground that 
secularism in the Islamic world is due to "degeneration of Islam". In other words, 
according to these scholars "real Islam" or "Qur'anic Islam" does not negate 
secularism, since secularism can pave the way to removing the "degenerated Islam" 
(Atay,1995: 98-103)^1
2.2.3 A Third Approach: Islam between Secularitv and the God’s Full Sovereignty
A different view on Islam and secularity comes from Muhammed Ammara and 
Abdullahi Ahmad An-Naim. According to Ammara (1994:53-87), the dominant 
political thought of Islam that gives all sovereignty to God is not true. For him, 
authors that put the God's sovereignty understand Quran mistakenly. According to 
him, the source of sovereignty is Umma itself However, he does not advocate for 
any secularist understanding. According to him, state and religion cannot be 
separated from each other. Nonetheless, although he does not advocate for 
secularism, he believes that there is some room for secularity in life that Islam 
permits. In other words, Ammara (1994:97-130,263-304) believes that an Islamic 
state is between secularism and religious fanaticism. As a matter of fact, the title of 
his book reflects this point: Ad-Dawlatu'I Islamiyya Bayna'l llmaniyya wa's 
SuJtani'dDiniyya (Islamic State: Between Secularism and Religious Authority).
Another interesting view originates from Mahmoud Taha and Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Naim. Personally, An-Naim does not believe in the virtues of secularity. 
He says (1990: 48):
My analysis would exclude the secularist approach in the Muslim 
context from the renewal-reform tradition because secularism is 
not an Islamic response to the challenges facing Muslim societies.
'"This book (Atay(et al,1995) that was published by the University o f Theology o f Ankara has been 
regarded as a reflection o f the “modemist/official Islam”. For a critique o f the book, see Mehmet 
Bayrakdar, ‘İslam G erçeği’ K itabı Üzerine, (Ankara: Fecr Yayınevi, 1995).
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It is true that the secularist line of thinking was born out with the 
needs and aspirations of modern Muslim societies. Nevertheless, 
and by definition, secularism is not an Islamic response. While 
fully accepting that many aspects of shari'a are untenable and 
unworkable today, I do not believe that secularism is the answer.
Aspirating from Mahmoud Taha, An-Naim proposes a new, original method. It may 
be called the Reverse Naskh. According to the naskh theory*  ^ generally, later 
Quranic Verses abrogate the validity of the verses that come before and contrary to 
the latter. However, in the theory of Mahmoud Taha and An-Naim, the political 
verses of Quran that come mainly later in Madina (so known as Madani verses) can 
be abrogated by more universal and nonpolitical (Macci) verses through the tool of 
riaskli {Arv-Haim, 1990: 52-68).
2.2.4. Secularization. Rationalization and Islam
As stated before, according to some thinkers, such as Weber and Berger (1967), 
"rationalization" is very related to secularization. In this context, Schulze implies 
the "rationalionality" of Islam hence its predisposition to secularity, emphasizing its 
“anthropocentrism”*'*. For him, the Islamic dogmas have not permitted to establish 
religious institutions apart from people. Hence, Islam has realized one of the most 
important preconditions of secularity (Schulze, 1994: 56). For Schulze, in order to 
consider the world in the "secular criteria", "theocentric”'^  understanding of the 
world should be abandoned. Transition to "anthropocentric" paradigm from 
"theocentric" paradigm is the nucleus of the development of secularity (Schulze, 
1994:57). Consequently, Islam has the nucleus of secularity, because, for Schulze,
*^For the naskh theoiy, see Ebu Ishak Eş-Şatıbi, E]-M uvafakat-Îslami İlim ler M etodolojisi vol 
/ ,Translated by M. Erdoğan (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1993) pp. 97-112.
"Anthropocentric” means “literally, centering in man. A tenn which may be used in connection with 
extreme humanism, viewing the world in terms only o f human experience.” The D ictionary o f  Philosophy, 
edited by D. D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.).
' ’^’Theocentric” refers to “having God as the central interest and ultimate concern”. W ebster’s  Third N ew  
International Dictionary, (Massachusetts: G&C. Merriam Company, 1976).
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the "anthropocentric" world-view had been the dominant view among Muslims'® 
until their acceptance of the "orientalist discourse" which claims that "there is no 
secularity in Islam" (Schulze, 1994:61-64). Therefore, for Schulze, Muslims should 
get rid of the "orientalist discourse" and discover the tradition again. Similarly, 
Also, Rodinson'^ (1973:passim) argues that Islam does not need a rationalization 
policy, since it is in fact rational. However, in that context, S. Muhammad Naquib 
Al-Attas thinks that Islam does not compromise with secularization. According to 
him (1985:37-38):
It is true that the Holy Qur'an also 'disenchanted' nature from the 
very moment of its revelation, and we can adduce more sacred 
verses in clear testimony of this fact without having a resort to 
heiTneneutics than the modernist Western- Christian theologians 
can from the Gospel; and yet we shall never be forced to find 
desperate utterance in compromising the meaning of the 
Revelation with secularization such that will make us see in those 
sacred verses the roots of secularization, or that secularization is 
the fruit of the Holy Qur'an. Islam 'disenchanted' nature, but only 
in sense of, and so far as, banishing the animistic and magical 
superstitions and beliefs and false gods from nature where indeed 
they do not belong. Islam did not completely deprive nature of 
spiritual significance.... The phenomenon of Islam and its impact 
in the history of worlds cultures and civilizations did in our view 
bring together the proper disenchanment of nature... without 
bringing about with it secularization.
'^According to Davutoğlu (1994:51-52), contrary to Schulze, Islam is “theocentric”. For him: “ Surah al- 
Ikhlas asserted an absolute ontological hierarcy. The inclination toward polytheistic particularism on the 
sphere o f divinity is rejected in the first verse of this surah- ‘Say: He is Allah, the One’-while in the 
following verses the ontological spheres o f the divinity and creatures are completely separated by the 
description o f a highly concentrated monotheistic framework opposing any kind o f kinship between God 
and creatures. Therefore this surah might be accepted as a short summary o f the theocentric structure, 
characteristic o f the whole Qur’anic system, against the ideas o f the particularization o f divinity”.
'^For a Turkish version of the Rodinson argument, see, Biinyamin Duran, “ Sekülerleşnıe-Laikleşme Süreci 
ve Gezegen Ölçeğinde Sonuçları , Köprü, no. 51, Summer 1995.
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Islam occupied a very important place in the Classical period of the Ottoman 
Empire. While this reality is accepted by all scholars, the extent of the role of Islam 
in the state and public affairs is debatable. While some scholars, such as Arsel 
(1993), Ateş (1994,1980), Ozankaya, and Mumcu (1986) argue that the Ottoman 
Empire is a theocracy that gets her power from God, and Islamic law Shari'a is the 
basic code of the state, some other scholars do not agree with this view, for 
example, Barkan, İnalcık, Köprülü, Mardin, Berkes, Özek and Heper.
Firstly, scholars who claim the secularity of the Ottoman political system 
generally support their arguments by the existence of Örf-/ Hukuk or Kanuns as 
secular code against Shari'a. Secondly, some scholars explain the secular orientation 
of the Ottoman bureaucracy. And thirdly, a kind of functional differentiation in the 
Ottoman empire that led to a secular government in the state can be mentioned.
2.3.1. The Secular Örf-iHukuk and Kanuns in the Ottoman Empire
2.3. Secularity in the Ottoman Empire
Following Ibn Haldun's classification that was mentioned before, according to a 
theoretician of the time of Mehmet II, Tursun Beg, there are two kinds of polity. 
One is based upon the religious principles, Shari'a, and the other is based upon 
reason or rational and not on religious principles. The second is called as Örfi 
Hukuk According to Tursun Beg, the great Yasa of Chengis Khan is an example of 
the latter (Sencer, 1974:67). That is, örfi hukuk (sometimes mentioned as Örf-i 
Sultam) exclusively refers to the will {irade) or command of the sultan as a secular 
ruler (İnalcık, 1969:438).
Historians have talked about Kanuns that existed since at least the time of 
Orhan I. According to Z.V. Togan (1981), in the time of Orhan I, the base of the 
state is not Shari'a but Yasa(k). The period of Bayazid I was a new stage in the
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development of the Örfî Hukuk. The örfi taxes, örfi confiscation of land (toprak 
tasarrufu), and örfi K ul (slave) system were developed in the time of Bayazid I 
(İnalcık, 1993:337). The real historical point for Örf is in the time of Mehmet II. In 
that time. Örfi Hukuk became dominant (İnalcık, 1993:337).
However, some scholars, such as Aydın (1994:384,386) and Halaçoğlu 
(1993:390-391) argue that Örfi Hukuk and Shari'a are harmonious, this is because 
the raison d ’etre of Örfi Hukuk is not to oppose the religious law or shari'a. 
Essentially, for him Örfi Hukuk was prepared by Nişancı who had to be medrese 
(religious college) educated and in Divan-i Humayun (imperial council) there were 
two main representatives of Shari'a: Kazasker of Anatolia, and Kazasker of 
Rumelia. Furthermore, Seyh-ul Islam could interfere in the process of the 
preparation of the Örfi Hukuk. Lastly, they argue that separating the Ottoman 
legislation into the religious {Shan) and secular {Örfî) is very artificial, because Ö rf 
itself is among the sources of Shari'a, and in the Ottomans, Ö rf-i Sultani must not 
be contrary to Shari'a.
However, some authors have demonstrated that many Kanuns could be 
contrary to Shari'a. According to İnalcık (1993:319), the Ottoman state could 
develop a legal system beyond the Islamic jurispundence. The Ottoman State could 
realize this by virtue of the concept of Örfi Hukuk. This is the capability of the 
Sultans to make laws that depend upon themselves, and not upon religious 
principles, for the long run benefits of the country (Levy, 1957:248-270). 
Furthermore, Barkan (1975:57-72) argues that in the government of land, imposing 
(secular) taxes, government of waqfes, criminal law, and the commercial law, we 
can observe many secular kanuns and practices that were contrary to Shari’a. So 
much so that, Barkan calls Örfas secular (1975:53). Moreover, according to Sencer 
(1974:80-182), there are four main örfi areas contrary to Shari'a. These are örfs in 
the criminal law, örfs in the military organizations, örfs in the financial law, and 
örfs related with laborers. More specifically, Kanuns for killing of the members of
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the dynasty, for punishment and killing of bureaucrats and Ulema (Mumcu, 1985: 
passim) were cases contrary to shari'a. Furthermore, the methods to terminate the 
Celali uprisings, the methods to confiscate lands, örfi taxes, and many kanuns in 
the general criminal system were contrary to the Shari'a. For example, while in the 
Islamic law punishment of adultery for a married person is to kill with stoning 
{Reciri) or at least to punish with a stick, in the Ottoman Kanuns, "adulterers were 
fired according to their means- three hundred akces for the middle-income group, 
and one hundred akces for the poor. For illegal sexual relations, unmarried persons 
were fired one hundred, fifty, forty, or thirty akces, according to their means" 
(inalcik, 1973:74).
There were Örfs omtrary to Shari'a in the area of International law. For 
example, according to the international law of Islam, a Muste'men (nonmuslim in 
an Islamic country-dar-ul Islam-for temporary time) should be treated like a muslim 
(Özel, 1991:319). In other words, Islamic law should be applied on Muste'men. 
However, the Ottomans treated muste'mens as Zimmis (nonmuslim citizens of the 
Ottoman State) by giving them Zimmi’s rights (Aydın, 1994: 428) also emphasizes 
this fact. He says: "There were several elements within this system (Ottoman 
System, ARU) which did not derive from Islam even indirectly." Berkes claims 
that, Islam was the cement of Ottoman society, but it did not define its significance 
and role in the system completely. In his view, Islam basically organized the private 
life of the Ottomans, and even so, it was not pure doctrinal Islam but a mixture of 
local beliefs and rituals as well. On the other hand, the public order was based on a 
legal framework which was not essentially Islamic (Berkes, 1982:162). A similar 
view comes from Köprülü (1983:34-35). For him, the Turks, even after they 
became Muslims, in spite of the “scant” and “undeveloped” theories of the Islamic 
law that does not permit a free legislation to state, established “high” and 
“progressive” political level in the Ottoman Empire. This is because the “very
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realist” rulers of the Turkish state did not pay attention to the “hypothetical” system 
of the Islamic jurist on the state affairs and used their old state tradition (Örf).
Furthermore, according to Barkan (1975:53) the role of Nişancı and 
Kadiasker (or Kazasker) should not be exaggerated, since they did not have any 
legislative power but they only carried out the law. Furthermore, Mumcu (1986:47) 
explains that secular bureaucrats took the place of Nişancı in time.
As stated above, some scholars mention the secular pragmatic orientation of 
the Ottoman bureaucacy. For example, Mardin (1993:350), by describing the 
pragmatism of the Ottoman bureaucracy as 'relative secularity' and by tracing the 
history of the Republican secularism to this, confirms the basic view concerning the 
secular aspects of the Ottoman system. He says:
What I have described as the “bureaucratic style” of government 
was the product of a special attitude among a group of secular 
officials who concentrated on the power dimension of social 
relations as the most important aspect of life. They were hard- 
headed, empirically minded and pragmatic. Their ideology was 
that of the “reason of state”.
A similar view comes from Heper (1985:25-26). He argues that there was a 
secular and state-oriented tradition {Adab) in the Ottoman bureaucracy. 
Furhermore, Özek in his 'Devlet ve Din' (n.d.:366) (state and religion) rejects the 
view that the Ottoman Empire was a theocracy. In his view, contrary to the tenets of 
a theocracy, in the Ottoman Empire, the state affairs {D evlet Maslahatı) were 
superior to the religious affairs.
We can also observe a functional differentiation in the state. For example, 
according to İnalcık (1964:43; 1969:438), the şeyhülislam  had no right to interfer 
directly in the government or in legal administration. For example:
Once, when Şeyhülislam  Ali Cemali Efendi came over to the seat 
of the government to protest against a decision of Sultan Selim I
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which he thought contrary to the shad’ah, the Sultan denounced 
him as interfering in state affairs (İnalcık, 1964:43-44).
Barkan (1975:53) says that in the Ottoman State, in their fetwas, şeyhülislams said 
the matter was not about religious affairs for the administrative matter, and they 
said it should be carried out in accordance with its requirements.
The superiority of state affairs on religion had even been valid after the 16th 
centuty when the power of religion increased (İnalcık, 1969:440).
2.4. Conclusion
Some scholars, such as Arsel, Ates, and Ozankaya argue that the Ottoman State 
system was a theocracy. In a theocracy " ultimate authority is considered to be 
rested in a divine law or revelation mediated through a variety of structure or 
politics" (Wallace, 1987: 429). However, in the Ottoman system we observe that the 
ultimate authority was secular, not religious or divine, and ultimate aim was to 
protect the state. So, as a conclusion, we can argue that in the Ottoman state, at the 
political level, there was some kind of secularity.
It can be also observed that there is relationship between the issues of 
“secularity in the Ottoman Empire” and “secularity and Islam”, since the 
intellectual underpinnings of the secularist view and the secular officialdom in the 
Ottoman Empire have common points, such as the concept of maşlaha. The 
Ottoman statesmen, like the secularist model, used the concept to legitimize various 
secular practices.**
This adab tradition on the bureaucracy, the pragmatist-secular orientation of 
Ottoman statesmen, the tradition of secular legislation, and the “ideology of state” 
were fundamental antecedents of both the Turkish secularism and positivism in
'*^See, M. Khadduri, “Maşlaha”. In The Encyclopedia o f  Islam, N ew Edition. Edited by C. E. Bosworth, E. 
Von Dannel, B. Lewis, and C. H. Pellat (Leiden: E. .T. Brill, 1991) Vol. VI, pp.738-740.
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Turkey. The secularism of the Young Turk movement, including Atatiirk’s 
secularizing movement, bore the stamp of the emprical and secular oriented 
Ottoman bureaucracy (Mardin,1993: 348). Furthermore, it can be observed that 
there was a relationship between the pragmatism of Ottoman officialdom and the 
positivististic predisposition in the 19th and 20th centuries. Even though the 
philosophical underpinning of positivism, which is explained in the third chapter, 
was different from that underlying the views of the Ottoman statesmen, the 
pragmatic concerns underlying the Western science did provide a common ground 
for both (Mardin, 1989: 136).
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CHAPTER 3
POSITIVISM 
SECULARISM 
POSITIVIST SECULARISM 
AND 
TURKEY
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3.1.Introduction
In this chapter my main aim is to explain one of the important aspects*  ^ of 
the intellectual content of secularism in Turkey in the 19th century and at the first 
half of the 20th century. I want to focus on the intellectual realm, since I believe 
that the secularization process in Turkey is mainly intellectual. This is supported by 
İnalcık (1969:444), Toprak (1981:39), Mardin (1971:232), and Mazrui (1984:408). 
İnalcık puts: “I would like to put a further stress... by saying that the real change of 
attitude toward Western civilization in the Ottoman-Turkish Society stated with this 
intellectual reorientation”. Toprak says: “Most of the Kemalist reforms during the 
early years of the Turkish republic aimed at changing the basic value structure of 
Turkish society rather than structural change per s e ’\ According to Mardin: “The 
Turkish revolution was not the instrument of a discontented bourgeoisie, it did not 
ride on a wave of dissatisfaction with the social order, and it did not have as target 
the sweeping away of feudal privileges, but did  take as a target the values of the 
Ottoman ancien régime. İn this sense it was a revolutionary movement”. In other 
words, for Mardin the Revolution is primarily the revolution of values. Lastly, 
according to Mazrui “ The Atatürk Reforms in Turkey... started from the premise 
that neither the state nor the economy could effectively be modernized unless 
Turkish culture itself was modernized. The soul of the nation had to be converted to 
a new allegiance before the limbs of the nation could perform their tasks 
effectively.”
'^Another important aspect o f Turkish secularism is “nationalism”. It can be obsei-ved that secularism in 
the Turkish context sei-ved to “invent” or create a “nation”, separating the “Turks” from the Umma. For 
this, see D. Dursun, Laiklik, Siyaset, ve Değişim, (İstanbul: İnsan, 1995) pp.77-8I. It is interesting that 
“Turkish nationalism” was under the influence o f positivism. Büşra Ersanh Behar, İktidar ve Tarih- 
Tûrkiye’de ‘R esm i Tarih’ Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937), (İstanbul; Afa Yayınları, 1992) pp.72-78.
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In my opinion, one of the important aspects of the intellectual content of this 
secularism is positivism. Secularism in Turkey was regarded in a positivistic 
manner. In other words, the intelligentsia (including state élite) in Turkey had 
“positivist secularism” in the last years of the 19th century and in the first half of 
the 20th century that will be explained below.
Before explaining the secularization process, the concept of ‘‘'positivism ' and 
the relationship between positivism and religion should be developed. After that, 
the nineteenth century mentality of the Turkish élite can give us the historical 
component of the concept o i “positivist secularism."
3.2.What is Positivism?
3.2.1. Definition of Positivism
Positivism, like secularity, is not an easy concept to define. So much so that, Scott 
Gordon (1991:271), in his book, “The History and Philosophy of Social Science” 
says that it would be helpful if he could begin the chapter of “French Positivism and 
the Beginnings of Sociology” with a clear definition of the term positivism but, that 
was not possible, since it had been, and continued to be, employed in varied ways. 
However, we need a definition despite the difficulties in the concept. According to 
Nicole Abbagnano (1967:414):
The characteristic theses of positivism are that science is the only 
valid knowledge and facts the only possible objects of knowledge; 
that philosophy does not possess a method different from science, 
and that the task of philosophy is to find the general principles 
common to all the sciences and to use these principles as guides to 
human conduct and as the basis o f  social organization (my 
emphasis). Positivism, consequently, denies the existence or 
intelligibility of forces or substances that go beyond facts and the 
laws as certained by science. It apposes any kind of metaphysics 
and, in general, any procedure of investigation that is not reducible 
to scientific method.
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In social science we can talk about two kinds of positivism. These are that of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century and that of the middle and late 
twentieth century or modem times that is also known as logical positivism  
represented by Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Sunar, 1986:95-105). These are 
not separated from each other and “common to both is a continuation of the 
eighteenth-century philosophy of the Enlightenment” (Kaplan, 1968:389). In other 
words, the definition given by Abbagnano above embraces both positivisms. 
However, the concept of positivism that I will use refers to the “classical” 
positivism o f the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The name
“positivism” derives from the emphasis on the “positive” sciences-that is “on tested 
and systematized experience rather than on undisciplined speculation” (Kaplan, 
1968:17). The term was first used^^by Saint-Simon to depict a scientific method 
and its extension to philosophy (Ural, 1986:17). Auguste Comte (1798-1857) 
employed the concept in its proper meaning, in his Discourse sur l ’ensemble du 
Positivism e (1848) and his Catéchisme Positiviste (1852) (Kremer-Marietti, 
1987:458). However, neither Saint Simon nor Auguste Comte created the idea of 
positivism. Before Comte and Saint-Simon, there were predecessors of positivism, 
and later Comte and Saint-Simon systematized it^ *. In other words, a manifold time 
is necessary to Comte's conception of science: the time for discovering the truth, or
Gordon argues that the first person who coined the term “positive science” was Madame de Steal, a 
popular novalist and a leading figure of the French Romanticism in her book De la littératurée dans ses 
rapports avec les institutions sociales (Literature Considered in its Relation to Social Institutions). “ 
Inspired more by ‘Condercef s utopianism’ than by Montesque’s analytical approach to social questions, de 
Staël was the centre of a group o f Freeh intellectuals who contented that the perfectiability o f man and 
society is possible, since all social problems are soluable by the use o f scientific knowledge and the 
application o f scientific knowledge in a state governed by scienticist” (Gordon, 1991: 271).
“ Positivism was created by the scientific progress that had started with Roger Bacon (1220-1292) the 
pioneer o f the experimental method. Other predecessors o f positivism, that can be identified among the 
founders o f positive science and o f whose names Comte often cited (Krenier-Marietti, 1987: 459), are 
Roger Bacon (1220-1292), Ockham (1285-1349), Copernicus (1473-1543), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), 
Kepler (1571-1631), Galileo Galilei (1564- 1642), Descartes (1596-1650), Hobbes (1588-1679), Locke 
(1632-1704), Newton (1642-1727), Voltaire (1694-1778), Leibniz (1646-1716), George Berkeley (1685- 
1753), David Hume (1711-1776), Jean le Rond d Alembert (1717-1775), Pierre-ean George Cabanis (1757- 
1808), Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), and Charles Fouerrier (1772-1837).
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method; the time of scientific progress, or the history of discoveries; the time for 
“awakening o f consciousness from simple sensation” (Kramer-Marietti, 1987:459). 
This transformation is depicted by Gordon (1991:273-274) from a different 
perspective:
(Positivism) belongs to a period in the history of Western Europe 
that witnessed a climactic transition between two worlds: from an 
old world of small agriculture, handicraft industry and limited 
trade, social localism and intimate community and conferment of 
political power to a small hereditary oligarchy; to a new world of 
large-scale machine industry, ubiquitous commerce, urbanization 
and the proletarianization of labor, a social psychology of 
nationalism, and the emergence of new classes to positions of 
political influence and power. Without excessive exaggeration it 
may be claimed that the social sciences are the products of social 
change, being intellectual responses to great and rapid alterations 
in traditional models of social organization and the disorder, often 
punctuated by violence, that accompanied them.
The description given above is very important for the understanding of development 
of Comte’s and other positivists’ mentality. It can be observed in the views of 
positivists that will be mentioned below.
3.2.2. Some Important Views of Positivism of the Nineteenth Century
Some characteristics of positivism are explained in the definition mentioned 
above, that is, the supremacy of science and reason and considering science as valid 
to explain social issues. Now, some important views of positivism will be 
explained that will help understand the issue under investigation.
First of all, Comte and his followers" viewed human history as progressing 
through three stages: the religious, the metaphysical and the scientific. This is
“"The main followers o f Comte are C. Bernard, Littré, E. Renan, H. Taine, P. Laffitte, E. Durkheim, .l.S. 
Mill, H. Spencer, and T. H. Huxley.
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known as the “law of three stages.” According to Comte, in the religious (or 
theological state), the human mind, looking for the essential nature of beings, 
supposes all phenomena to be produced by a theological action. In the metaphysical 
level, the human mind supposes, instead of a theological or supernatural beings, 
“abstract forces”, “veritable entities” that are capable of producing all phenomena. 
In its finality, the scientific or positive state, law, morality, politics and religion are 
all to be reconstituted on the new scientific basis. In this stage, “traditional 
religion”, for instance, is to be replaced by a “religion of humanity” and “reason” 
(Simon, 1963:passim).
'"‘'Progress' is one of the key concepts in positivism. Essentially, though the 
faith in progress or progressivist faith has been dominant since Hesiod (Nisbet, 
1980:4), during 1750-1900 the idea of progress reached its zenith in the Western 
mind in both popular and elitist senses (Nisbet, 1980:171). In that “zenith period” 
positivists, especially Comte, played an important role (Nisbet, 1980:251-258). For 
Comte, at the end of progress there is sociocracy', a new absolutist social regime 
based on science and religion of humanity and directed by a corporation of 
positivist philosophers. Sociocracy, through limiting liberties, will make impossible 
any deviation from the orthodox positivist faith or cults (Abbagnano, 1967:415). All 
these can be observed in the famous motto of the p o s itiv is tOrder and Progress'. 
Due to this, Nisbet includes Comte into the chapter called “Progress as Power”"^ 
(Nisbet, 1980:237; see Mill, 1948:12; Gordon, 1991:193).
We can observe such an absolutism in Saint-Simon’s view. So much so that, 
Nisbet (1980:238) argues that “absolutism is the essence of Saint-Simon’s New 
Christianity.”"“* L. Coser summarizes the doctrine of Saint-Simon as follows:
“^Tliis aiithoriaiiism can be due to tiie historical condition o f the nineteenth centuiy explained above with 
Gordon’s words.
“New Christianity” is a religion complete with ritual, dogma, and ceremony, but its substance is a 
combination of technology and sociology (Nisbet, 1980:226).
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They envisaged a new and stable order to replace the anarchy 
around them, but this order would have to embody science and 
progress, the deities had worshipped at the Ecole Polytechnique 
and other scientific schools. To them, science was holy, as was 
industry, but the most consecrated took was to bring to France a 
new integration, a drawing together of all its citizens (Nisbet, 
1980:247).
Abbagnano (1967:416) classifies Spencer and Huxley as “evolutionary 
positivists”. For him, “evolutionary positivism shared the idea of progress of 
general positivism but, its basis is not on society or history but on nature, physics 
and biology. Abbagnano (1967:416) argues that the doctrine of evolution-hence 
evolutionary positivism triumphed in 1859 with the publication of C. Dai*win’s 
book: Origin o f  Species.
It is also important to mention here the attitude of positivists to “theological 
religion.” Comte himself was an atheist and had been so since the age of thirteen, 
when he rejected Catholicism (Gordon, 1991:294). This can be observed in his 
letter to S. Mill in 1845:
Actually, the qualification of atheists suits me, going strictly by 
etymology, which is almost always a wrong way to explain 
frequently used terms, because we have in common with those 
who are so called nothing but disbelief in God, without sharing in 
any way with them their vain metaphysical dreams about the origin 
of the world or man, still less their narrow and dangerous attempts 
to systematize morals (Kremer-Marietti, 1987:460-1).
Generally positivists have negated theological religion' since it is a product 
of “primitive level”. For them, any primitive theological religion should be 
abandoned and the new positivist religion that rests upon science and reason should 
substitute theological religion (Özlem, 1995:174).
"^ ’’Evolutionary Positivism” is also important for the Turkish case that I will mention later.
49
However, this unbelief followed by very great part of positivism, has not 
prevented positivists from using “religion”. Comte and other positivists have 
appreciated the power of religion as a means of social control (Gordon, 1991:274), 
at least in a chaotic situation for a temporary time in a Machiavellian manner"^ ’.
To sum up, the positivists of the nineteenth century with some differences, 
mainly want to create a society that depends upon ''science' and "reason." This 
tendency can lead to an authoritarian regime as in the case of the French positivists, 
such as Comte and Saint-Simon.
3.3. Positivism. Secularism and Positivist Secularism
Positivism of the nineteenth century was very influential in Western and 
non-Western countries. In non-Westem countries positivism was effective in the 
context of modernism. Intelligentsia and modernising state elite of the non-Westem 
countries have perceived positivism as an effective remedy to modernize their 
countries. Therefore, modernizing intelligentsia and state élites of undeveloped 
countries have associated positivism with secularism. In other words, they have 
wanted to use secularism to reach the modern, “positive”, or “scientific” level.
Here, the concept of p o sitiv ist secularism  is used in the meaning of 
positivists’ understanding of secularism. In my opinion, positivist secularists see 
secularization as an essential process to social progress and "scientific society". 
This kind of secularism can be observed in various parts of the world, such as 
Turkey, Latin America, and the Soviet Union."’
"^Interestingly, Toktamış Ateş thinks o f Machiavelli as “the first secularist” (Ateş, 1994:60).
"^For the case o f the Soviet Union, see Dimitiy V. Pospielovsky, A H istory o f  M arxist-Leninist A theism  
and S oviet A nti-R eligious P olicies- Vol 1 o f  A H istory o f  S oviet Atheism  in Teory and Practice, and 
the Believers, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); and Yaacov Ro’i “The Secularization o f Islam and 
the USSR’s Muslim Areas”. In M uslim Eurasia-Conßicting Legacies. Edited by Yaacov Ro’i, 
London:Frank Cass, 1995; and, Baymirza Hayit, “Sovyetler Birliği’nin Müslüman Toplunılannı İslam’dan 
Uzaklaştırma Politikası”, B elgelerle Türk Tarihi, No: 13, March 1986.
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In the following section, in order to understand better the concept of 
positivist secularism, before turning our full attention to the Turkish context, the 
concept o f positivist secularism is developed in the context of a Latin American 
country, Brazil, since Brazil is a good example which is mentioned in the literature 
on secularism.
3.3.1. An Example: Positivist Secularism in the Context of Brazil
The essential factor for the development of positivist secularism is the development 
of the positivist mind at least in the intelligentsia or state élite of a country. Latin 
America is a good example where positivist secularism is developed.
In Latin America, the secularization of the intellectual and cultural life of the 
continent began much earlier than other areas of non-Western countries through 
spreading of the ideas of the Enlightenment. This is because the ideas of the 
Enlightenment and then positivism were translated quickly to the Spanish and 
Portuguese languages (Smith, 1974b: 124). For example, it can be observed that in 
Brazil, like France, the nineteenth century was regarded as positivist era. This fact 
is explained by Gilberto Freyce (1986:310) in his book: “Order and Progress”: 
“Considered as a point in cultural and intellectual history, it was the great age of 
Positivism in the south and Teutonic and Spencerian thought in the North, all of had 
an adverse effect on orthodox Catholicism, as well as on jurisprudence and belles- 
lettres and on the general aesthetic values of the more sophisticated”. Of course, the 
dominance of positivism in that time was not only due to the translations. 
Essentially, the secular intelligentsia had started to emerge since the establishment 
of the first academy in 1724 (The Brazilian Academy of the Forgotten or Academia 
dos Esquecidos) in Salvador. Parallel to this, reforms, and modernization of 
education were observed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This 
modernization contributed to the Enlightenment, hence to positivism in Brazil
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(Bums,1975:217). For example, Bishop José .Toaquim da Cunha de Azeredo 
Coutinlio carried out some reforms on education. The curriculum put a new 
emphasis on the '"’'positive sciences\ the Bishop abandoned Aristotelian world-view 
in favor o f the Cartesian world-view.
Professor Father Miguel .Toaquim de Almeida e Castro, at the 
solemnities accompanying the opening of classes, delivered an 
impassioned address in which he evoked a new enlightened age of 
glorification of the sciences and arts to supplant the ‘dark 
centuries’ of the past. Drawing on a wide variety of European, 
particularly French, authorities to substantiate his thesis, he 
asserted that only the sciences could “illuminate the darkness” and 
dispel ignorance and superstition (Burns, 1975: 222-223).
From this quotation, it can be seen that especially in the nineteenth century, the 
French influence was dominant in Brazil. This was because o f “ the large number of 
French books imported” and many Brazilians visiting and studying in France. The 
arrival o f the French cultural missioner in 1816 can be added to the factors that 
created the French intellectual domination (Burns, 1975:228). This was of course 
very important for the development of the French positivism in Brazil. I want to 
present the mind of the intelligentsia with a quotation from Freyce that gives us 
important cues about the positivist mentality of the intelligentsia:
In 1879, The Chamber of Deputies was discussing the problem of 
the relationship between the Church and higher education in 
Brazil. One of the speakers... was moved to exclaim: 'I am not an 
enemy of the Catholic Church, gentlemen.... But what I do oppose 
is this political Catholicism...’The Speakers was a deputy from the 
province of Pernambuco: Oaquim Nabuco.... What he was 
opposing was the Brazilian tendency to create more free Catholic 
colleges, similar to those of Belgium, colleges which he feared 
would become bastions of orthodoxy in opposition to science. And 
without science there could be no true Brazilian progress.... This 
was his goal: ‘national progress, scientific freedom’....Brazil was 
then just at the beginning of a period when Progress was the god
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and science the goddess of the intellectual élite, so much so that it 
was considering, with Martins Junior, the replacement of lyric 
poetry with ‘scientific poetry’ and, with others, of substituting, the 
traditional faith with ‘scientific religion’. ‘Scientific politics’, 
‘scientific dictatorship’, ‘scientific criticism’ were yet further 
expressions current in a Brazil already republican in some aspects 
of its life. Thus it was that man like the young oaquim Nabuco 
could not conceive of religion except in a scientific context... This 
was the way another ordent apologist for ‘national progress’, Ruy 
Barbosa, also felt about matters of religion. In the imperial alliance 
of Church and State, he, along with other young public figures of 
intellectual bent, perceived the obstacle to both science and 
progress in Brazil (Freyce, 1986:285-6).
The positivist secularism in Brazil can be well understood from the quotation 
above. Furthermore, this kind of secularism is very related with the concepts of the 
political-culture (transvaluation) secularization and polity-dominance secularization 
of the five components of secularization explained in the first chapter.
The development of secular intelligentsia and modernization of education 
with the idea of the Enlightenment challenged the “philosophical edifice” of 
scholasticism based on sacred authority, and in the late eighteenth century the 
universities turned their forces from theological speculation to “positive sciences” 
(Smith, 1974b: 124).
Especially from the 1860’s to the turn of the century, positivism 
was the dominant school of social and political thought. Based on 
Auguste Comte’s developmental theory of history (theological, 
metaphysical, and positive stages), positivism  reinforced 
anticlericalism  and provided  support for the view  that 
secularization was absolutely essential to social progress (my 
emphasis). Positivism was the stage in which the premises and 
methods of science would be applied to all the problems of society 
(Smith, 1974b: 125).
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Essentially, according to Smith (1974b) the positivist understanding of secularism 
can be valid in almost all Latin American countries, in addition to Brazil 
(Smith, 1874b: 125). For example, Mexico can also be considered in that context. 
Furthermore, the authoritarian strong polity-dominance secularization in Mexico to 
secularize the political culture and mind (Smith, 1974b: 128; Cornelius and 
Craig, 1988:430-431) may be considered as the authoritarian regime which the 
positivists of that time who were heavily affected by the French positivism wished 
for.
To sum up, the positivist secularism in the Brazilian context tried to 
secularize the country by getting rid of the social significance of religion in order to 
progress and reach the so-called “scientific” society.
In my opinion, there are similarities between the Brazilian case and the 
Turkish case in the context discussed above that will be elaborated below.
3.4. Positivism in the Turkish Context
The Ottoman Empire encountered many fundamental problems that started mainly 
in the second half of the sixteenth century. The days in those times were not the 
same as the old ones. In that period, many memorandums expressed to the sultans 
the problems and their solutions. The most famous was R isale o f K oçi Beg. Koçi 
Beg and others asserted that a major cause of the disorganization of the empire was 
the abandonment of the fundamental rule of justice (the old Oriental maxim that a 
ruler can have no power without the well-being of his subjects and no popular well­
being without justice) (İnalcık, 1964:43). Therefore, in the seventeeth centuiy, the 
statesmen were seeking a “domestic” solution to the problem without breaking the 
traditional cycle around the empire. However, under the impact of the defeats in 
Hungary between 1683 and 1699 the Ottoman Turks became aware of the
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superiority of the West for the first time. This bitter reality upset the whole 
Weltanschuungs of the Ottoman Empire. According to Rustow (1973:95);
The turning point was loss of Hungary to the Habsburgs in 1783- 
99 and of the Ukraine and the Crimea to the Romanovs in 1768- 
93- defeats which, for the Ottomans, involved something far more 
precious than territory or strategic position. They posed a 
fundamental problem in statecraft and even in theodicy; they 
threatened the very basis of self-confidence. For the first time, 
Ottomans had occasion to question the rationale of a state founded 
on Muslim conquest of Christians and of a religious revelation that 
promised its believers prosperity and power on earth as well as 
salvation in the hereafter. In matters of warfare at least... it now 
was painfully clear that Ottoman Muslims must learn from the 
despised infidel.
The 19th century was a period of profound soul-searching for the Ottoman 
intellectuals. They reconsidered their outlook to the world, and their basic 
conceptualizations of state, society, nature and humans. The Western supremacy in 
military, politics, economics, science, and arts put to test also the general, cultural 
and human values current among the Ottoman intellectuals“*. Beyond the 
considerations of improving the power and efficiency of the state and establishing 
the essentials of an internationally acceptable political order, the most fundamental 
tenets o f the Ottoman thought, civilization, understanding of science, nature, in 
short the Ottoman Weltanschauung deeply shaken. There had emerged a need 
to develop a response to the Western- modern world (Türköne,1995:passim).
In such a cultural, political, economic and intellectual context, the Ottoman 
bureaucracy and intelligentsia started to look more closely into the West and tried 
to get the “secret” of the Western Supremacy. The Ottoman intelligentsia and 
statesmen encountered the Western science and technology as the sources of the
“^The superiority of the West in the eyes of the Ottoman intelligentsia is seen in the poem of Ziya Pasha:
Diyar-i küfrü gezdim beldeler kaşaneler gördüm
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supremacy in a very bewildered position. This can be observed from the words of 
an intellectual:
But, as it has been said so far, European countries transformed 
itself from an uncivilized position to a civilized position with the 
power of reason and love of their countries. In conclusion,
Europe that was a small country (kit’a-i sagir) among others 
becomes the center of all of the power of humanity by virtue of 
sciences and technologies (ulum ve funun) (Hanioglu, 1986:13).
Therefore, for the Ottoman intelligentsia and statesmen there was only one way to 
save the empire: To import the western ulum and fimuiT^ (Hanioglu, 1986:16). 
This was not very difficult for the bureaucracy since the Ottoman bureaucracy had 
an empiricist and pragmatist mind. Essentially, Selim III and Mahmut II had 
established the tradition of realpolitilc^ in the bureaucracy (Mardin, 1993:351; 
Shaw and Shaw, 1977:71).
Dolaştım mülki İslâmî bütün viraneler gördüm 
(I visited the Christian land and palaces I saw 
I visited Islam’s lands and mins I saw.)
This idea was seen in a similar manner by famous Evliya Çelebi, a Turkish traveller: “Kafiristandan 
ma’mur bir dar-diyar görmedim ve İslam diyarı kadar harab-abad görmedim” (I have not seen a country 
more flourishing than the Christian lands, and lands more ruined than the Islam’s) (Kaipat, 1959: 58).
Essentially, the Ottomans encountered with "science" before full turns to the West. This firstly was by 
the permanent embassies. The first non- western state in the world that opened permanent embassies was 
the Ottoman Empire (Hurewitz, 1961:141). These embassies were first opened in London, Paris, Vienna 
and Berlin.
In 1797, the Ottoman Ambassador in France Morali Seyyid A h  Efendi visiiQd the obseiwatoiy, and 
watched the stars and the moon. This was veiy important for Morali Seyyid Ali Efendi. He depicted this 
visit by great enthusiasm (See, Kuran, 1994:4). Essentially, in 1721, Ambassador Yinnisekiz Çelebi 
Mehmet Efendi meniioned the Copernic system (Kuran, 1994: 5). In those times, in the Ottoman Empire, 
tlie Batlymaus tlieoiy of the world centered universe was predominant.
After Ali Efendi, in a few years, when envoy Abdurrahim Muhip Efendi visited the same Paris 
Obseiwatoiy, he mentioned the meteors, the content of air, its physiological effects, air tension and the 
science o f Chemistiy (Unat, 1968:200).These attempts o f the Ottoman Embassies and diplomats were veiy 
important in the context of first knowing the western science and technology as the secret o f the western 
supremacy, and paved the way to emergence of interest o f the Ottoman Intellectuals and statesmen on the 
Western science and "scientific" reasoning. These permanent embassies of the Ottoman Empire were 
indeed a veiy important door opened to the West (Lewis, 1961:60) and they prepared an intellectual 
condition for positivism. See, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Modern Bilimlerin Türkiye’ye Girişi”. In 75. 
Yılında Türkiye'de Sosyoloji Edited by İsmail Coşkun (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık).
Realpolitik is “a German temi referring to power politics. It emphasizes policies based more on practical 
power considerations and less on moral and ethical considerations.”(Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 
International Relations Theory (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987) pp.602.)
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Therefore, this secular-oriented and pragmatic bureaucracy carried out a 
very important reform to get the ulum and funun of the West officially with ease 
(Birand, 1955:5). This was the “modernization of education”. Essentially, 
modernization attempts of education had started since Selim III. For example, after 
Mahmut I, in the military engineering schools, Turkey was teaching "positive 
science”, but the aim of this was only technical, not systematic. In other words, 
"traditional knowledge" did not decrease with this science (Berkes, 1964:66).
The two very crucial two factors in this context were the opening of 
M ekteb-i T ıb b iye 'm 1826 in the time of Mahmut II (1805-1839) and the opening of 
R üşdiye  in the Tanzimat period (1839-1873).
3. 4.1. The Rise o f Positivism in Turkey
The 19th century is known as the “positivist century” (Gökberk, 1986:302). This 
positivism that affected the Turkish intelligentsia heavily came to Turkey with the 
modernization that has been mentioned above.
M ekteb-i Tıbbiye and the military Rüşdiye were the main sources of 
positivism and positivistic materialism. Ottoman intellectuals encountered firstly 
with zoology, surgical and anatomic knowledge. Biological materialism and social 
Darwinism were very common in M ekteb-i Tıbbiye. This can be observed in the 
case of new religious students of Tıbbiye who were convinced to abandon their 
traditional views by readings of C. Darwin’s book (Hanioğlu, 1986:51). 
Furthermore, in 1847 Mac Farlane, on his visit to M ekteb-i Tıbbiye, was surprised 
very much, when he encountered by a full collection of Materialism that he had not 
seen before. He was surprised again when he found out that the students of Tıbbiye 
were reading the French positivist- materialists, such as Baron d  Holbach da 
Cabonis (lşm,n.d. :365). The military Rüşdiye was another center of positivism.
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According to Mardin (1993:359), moving upward in the system of military 
education was going parallel with acquiring a positivist world-view.
Second important factor in the rising of positivism in Turkey was 
translations. There were many translations regarding positivism and naturalism 
(Korlaelçi, 1986:202). In 1843, translated some philosophical dialogues
from Fenelon, Fantenelle and Voltaire (Muhaverat-i H ikm etiye). Şinasi as one of 
the first positivists (Korlaelçi, 1994:37) translated some parts from Lamartine, 
Racine. In 1874 Teodor Kasap translated a play from Alexander Dumas. In 1891, 
M uallim N aci tried to translate Thérèse Raquain of Emile Zola but could not 
complete it. Other books of Zola were translated by Rüştü, Halid Ziya, Sahip, 
Burhaneddin and Sadri (the full names of some are not known) (Korlaelçi, 
1986:201-204). Beşir Fuad translated some books from V. Bernard, Emile Otto, 
Emile Zola, Lewes, and Haver (Okay,n.d:223-229). Furthermore, some books from 
positivist-naturalist Cuy de Maupassant and the life story of positivist Hippolitte 
Taine from Poul Bourged were translated. In 1896, Goncourt Brothers’, in 1914 
positivist E. Renan’s works were translated (Korlaelçi, 1986:201-204).
Third factor for rising positivism was organizations, or societies 
(İhsanoğlu, 1987a: 1-5). These societies emerged in the nineteenth century, and were 
inspired by “Academie Françoise” (Kazancıgil, 1995:72), such as ‘Encümen-i 
D anış’ (Society of Knowledge). Encümen-i Daniş was set up in 1851 by an 
Imperial irade (will). It consisted of forty Turks and a number of corresponding 
members, including some European Orientalists, such as Hammer, Bianchi, and 
Redhouse. Its programme included the encouragement of letters and sciences, and 
the advancement of the Turkish language on science (Lewis, 1961:437).
A more important society was The Cem iyet-i İlm iye-i Osmaniye (The 
Ottoman Scientific Society) modeled on the Royal Society of England. It was 
founded in 1861 by M ünif Paşa, a graduate of the Translation Chamber. This 
society informed great masses on the “positive sciences”. The most important
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influence of this society was the publication of the M ecm ua-i Fiinun (Journal of 
Sciences), which was the first scientific periodical in Turkish (Lewis, 1961:437). 
M ecm ua-i Fiinun played a role in the nineteenth century Turkey analogous to that 
of the Grande Encyclopédie in France in the eighteenth century (Lewis, 1961:438). 
In other words, we can consider M ecm ua-i Fiinun as a movement of the Turkish 
Enlightenment'. Nonetheless, İhsanoğlu (19876:219-220), one of the important 
experts in this area, argues that both the Cem iyet-i İlm iye-i Osmaniye and 
M ecm ua-i Fiinun could not produce any “real scientific output". However, another 
important expert, A. Kazancigil, does not agree with İhsanoğlu. For Kazancigil 
(1995:73-74), both the society and journal created a great intellectual movement in 
its time. Furthermore, the society gave lectures to people in Eminönü, Istanbul. 
According to Kazancigil (1995:74), these lectures were very influential in the 
development of positive science in Turkey.
Another important society in that context which contributed to the rise of 
positivism was Türk B ilg i D em eği (Turkish Society of Knowledge) that was 
established in 1914 by Celal Sahir, Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuat, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, 
Ahmed Ağayef (Ağaoğlu), Selanikli Doktor Rıfat, Mühendis Salim, Ziya Gökalp, 
Dr. Nazım and Haşim Bey. Other important names in the society were Salih Zeki, 
Hüseyin Cahit, and Hamdullah Suphi (Toprak, 1987:248-249). The main aim of the 
society was “the scientific revolution”. According to them, only with the “scientific 
revolution” the country could get rid of the “scholastic” and the “medieval mind” 
(Toprak, 1987:250). The society determined between 1914-1915 to deliver lectures 
about “ the positivist understanding of science” (Toprak, 1987:251). The society 
published a Journal that was titled as B ilg i M ecm uasf (Journal of Knowledge). 
Apart from the members of the society, A. Cevdet’s articles appeared in the Journal 
(Toprak, 1987:252-254).
^*For Mecmua-i Fiinun, see Yeşim Işık, Bir Aydınlanma Hareketi Olarak M ecmua-i Fünun, 
Unpublished Master’s thesis. İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1986.
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In addition, since the Tanzimat period, some students had been sent to 
Europe. Before 1841, it had been limited to military aim. After that time, for other 
aims, students were sent. These students were affected heavily by positivist thought 
in Europe. For example, Şinasiv^diS, an important proto-type of this kind of students, 
since he was sent to Europe and there he encountered with the positivists, such as 
Pierre Lafitte (Korlaelçi, 1994:25-6).
In that period, it can also be observed that there is a close relationship 
between positivism, and the Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) and the Young 
Turks. Positivism in the Union and Progress and the Young Turks can be observed 
the best from the official journal of the Union and Progress, “M echveret”. The 
Programme of the Union and Progress was published in the first issue of M echveret 
in 1985. In the programme many positivistic thought can be observed, like “order 
and progress”. The logo of Mechveret shows better this fact written in French:
Premierre aanée, Supplément Français 1er décembre 1895 (Frédéric 107)
No:1 Parissant 2 fois
par Mois Prix 
du
Rédactiom MECFIVERET Numéro avec le
48, Rue Monge,48 supplément
Paris 25 cent.
Organ de la Jeune 
Turquie, Publié sous 
la direction d'Ahmed Rıza
"ORDRE ET PROGRESS"
The calendar in the logo {Frédéric 107) is Comte’s invention as the calendar 
positivists. The name in logo “Ahmet Rıza” is among Young Turks or the Jeune 
Turguie. Ahmet Rıza fell under the influence of Pierre Lafitte, a disciple of Comte 
in Paris. Pierre Lafitte instructed Ahmet Rıza in the positivist philosophy that was to 
dominate his thinking. According to Lewis, it is probably through Ahmet Riza’s
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positivism that the group in Istanbul changed its name from İttihad-i Osmani 
(Ottoman Union) to İttihat ve Terakki, the Union and Progress that seems like a 
positivist motto (Lewis, 1961:198).
The general world-view of the Young Turks was positivistic like Ahmet Rıza 
himself. This positivism embraced both kinds of positivism-social and evolutionary 
positivisms that I explained before. This argument is confirmed by Hanioğlu 
(1986:51, 54-6). According to him. Young Turks thought that science could be 
applied for all problems to be solved. For example, the Young Turks looked for 
“scientific government” to save the country. Furthermore, Social Darwinism that 
can be regarded as a view in the evolutionary positivism that was explained before 
was widespread among the Young Turks.
In addition, apart from the ideas of progress and ultimacy of science, we also 
see the idea of order and absolutism in the Young Turks. Although some 
individualistic ideas can be seen in the Young Turks influenced by Prens 
Sabahattin and ''teşebbüs-i şahsi” (private initiative), in the final analysis, the 
positivist idea became dominant among the Young Turks. This is seen in the motto 
of the Young Turks: There are no “I” or “you”, but “we” (Hanioğlu, 1986:53-4).
In short, in the late nineteenth century and in the “twentieth century, the 
main element on the change of culture^" was positivism” (Kuran, 1990:219). Thus, 
it is very natural that the positivist mind regarded religion in accordance with 
positivism that will be explained below.
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“ It was possible to see positivism in the literature too. Under the influence of positivism, Servet-i Fiinun 
(1891-1942) was published by Ahmed Şuayp and Hüseyin Cahit. They were affected by H. Taine 
(Mardin,1990:169). In addition, in the journal, there was the direct influence o f Comte (Ülken, 1992:154). 
In the issues of Servet-i Fünun, we see some translations from positivists and naturalists such as Ernest 
Renan, Guy de Maupassant, and Edmond de Goncourt. Some articles carried the positivist thought of 
Turkish positivists such as Nureddin Ferh. Furthermore, in some novels o f that literaiy trend of Servet-i 
Fünun, the positivist mind is seen (Kavcar, 1985:82-83).
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The positivist intelligentsia was not so consonant with the idea of religion- Islam. 
Islam was now perceived as a remnant of the ancient regime, and hence as a barrier 
for progress (Hanioğlu, 1986:39; Hanioğlu,n.d:9). Therefore, ulema was seen as 
“ignorant charlatans rather than as repositories of ancient wisdom”, in Mardin’s 
words (Mardin, 1993:360). Toprak (1981:2) also indicates the fact that the Turkish 
intellectuals had identified the decline of the Ottoman Empire with the Islamic 
milieu.
Some positivists, such as Münif Paşa, mentioned the role of science to 
preserve society from ^"itikadat-i batıla’" (false-beliefs) (İhsanoğlu, 1987:219). 
However, according to Hanioğlu, “in a short period, the critiques of itikadat-i batıla 
became the idea encountered most. Most of the critiques used “itikadat-i batıla as 
synonym of religion in a roundabout way” (Hanioğlu, 1986:22).
While “itikadat-i batila”was identified with religion, we also see another 
conce'pi-miistahase (residue or fossil) that was appearing with increasing frequency 
in the vocabulary of the Ottoman progressive-positivist intellectuals. Islam as a 
“theological religion” was regarded by these intellectuals as miistahase 
(Mardin, 1993:358).
The positivists that regarded religion as a fossil of the ancient times (from 
the theological or the religious stages) naturally wanted to get rid of this obstacle on 
the road of progress. This was secularism.
3.4.3. Positivist Secularismdn Turkey
3.4.2. Positivist Intelligentsia and Religion
So far, I have attempted to show the mentality of the Turkish positivist 
intelligentsia. It can be seen that the growing adherence to scientific knowledge and 
positivist-modern ideas dominated the Ottoman Intelligentsia and the state élite.
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Hence, a positivist-modernist intelligentsia became dominant (Hanioglu, 1986:26), 
and, in the late nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Turkish-positivist secularism emerged.
Before investigating positivist secularism that focuses on an important part 
of transvaluation secularization, it will be useful to demonstrate the dimensions of 
the secularization process in Turkey. When Smith’s classification of the dimensions 
of secularization is used in the Turkish context, the result is as follows. First of all, 
the polity-separation secularization has not taken place with its full sense in the 
Turkish context. According to Toprak (1981:56-7) “the secularists of the 
Republican period were unable to escape the type of religious controversy that 
earlier reformists had encountered: whether or not it is possible to separate religion 
and politics in an Islamic society. Paradoxical as it may sound, the very effort of 
separating religion and state during the Kemalist period followed the implicit 
assumption that in an Islamic society, the two cannot be separated but that one must 
be subservient to the other.” In 1924, the abolition of Şeyhülislam took place. In its 
place, two institutions were created. These were \h&Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü 
(Directorate for Religious Affairs) and the E vkaf Umum Müdürlüğü (Directorate- 
General for Pious Foundations). “The establishment of these directorates clearly 
shows that the Kemalist perception of secularism meant not so much separation of 
state and religion as control of the state over religion” (Zürcher, 1994:195).
Secularization attempts in the Ottoman Empire had mainly a polity-
expansion characteristics. The reformist state élite concentrated on creating new
secular institutions, rather than replacing the religious institutions, such as new
secular schools and medreses, new Nizamiye Courts and Şeria Courts (Yavuz,
1991:27-69). In that time, for example, the scope of the Kanuns was extended to
include a new code of commercial law, other similarly secular laws and a system of
secular courts called adliyye  (İnalcık, 1969:443). Socio-political functions of
religion have gradually declined since the 18th century. “And with the
«
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establishment o f the Republic, the state has taken over most of Islam’s institutional 
functions in society except the religious ones. Polity expansion has been especially 
pronounced in the realm of law and education” (Toprak,1981:57).
Transvaluation secularization is the transformation of traditional values to 
the modem ones. It can be called as '"‘'symbolic secularization" (Toprak, 1981:40). 
Intellectual realm (or it may be called as intellectual secularization), that is 
investigated in this study, is in the realm of the transvaluation or symbolic 
secularization. As stated in the first chapter, Geertz defines culture as a historically 
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols. Hence symbolic 
secularization is to transform culture. “This is precisely what some of the Kemalist 
reforms attempted to do” (Toprak, 1981:41).
Polity-dominance secularization exists in Turkish secularism in a certain 
degree (Smith, 1974a:8). This secularization, as stated before, refers to a radical 
program of secularization by a totalitarian or an authoritarian regime.
Turkish positivist secularism can be defined as an intellectual and political 
pledge to the principles of secularity, modernity, and positivism in the endeavor of 
transforming Turkish society from a traditional and religious level to a modern and 
scientific phase, and the political implementation of these values to fulfill this 
purpose.
In that respect, secularism as a political ideology was crystallized as an 
aspect of modernization only with the rise of the Young Turk movement, and with 
the establishment of the Second Constitution in 1908 (Mert,1992). This was 
because the period of the Second Constitution was the first time that the positivist 
secularists got the political power and intellectual supremacy. However, it was the 
establishment o f the Republic of Turkey in 1923 that can be considered as the most 
significant step toward the development of positivist secularism in Turkey. As a 
matter of fact, according to Timur (1968:116), positivism entered Turkey as a 
universal and secular method.
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The secularist proposal of A. Cevdet^^that will be explained below as a 
positivist Young Turk (Kaynardag,n.d.:765) can be regarded as an example of the 
positivist/secularist mentality. In 1912, the periodical İçtihat, edited by A. Cevdet, 
published two articles entitled as “Рек Uyanık Bir Uyku” (А Very Wakeful Sleep). 
In these articles, there were reform proposals that would be realized later by 
Atatürk. Although the name under the articles was Kilizade Hakkı, some authors 
have assumed that the real owner of the proposals was Abdullah Cevdet (Lewis 
1961:236). These articles depicted a vision of the future of Turkey, seen in a dream. 
According to this vision that was very radical in those times, the Sultan would have 
only one wife, and he did not have any Cevari, that is cariyes (concubines); the fez 
would be abolished, and a new headgear should be adopted; women would dress 
themselves in a very pleasant manner; women would be free to choose their 
husbands, and “the practice of match-making” would be given up; zaviyes, tekkes, 
and medreses would be closed, a new modem education would be prepared; sank 
(turban) and cübbe (cloack) would be limited to “certificated professional men of 
religion”; vows and offerings to the saints would be prohibited; exorcists, 
“witchdoctors, and the like would be suppressed”(Lewis 1961:236; Hanioğlu, 
n.d:375-383). We can add to the list above the change of the alphabet and old law 
that A. Cevdet and his friends were arguing for (Hanioğlu, n.d:383).
From the proposals it is understood that A. Cevdet’s understanding of 
secularism starts with dissolving the predominant “irrational” and “unscientific” 
cultural structure of Ottoman society where irrationalities such as tekkes and 
za viyes  existed (Kara, 1990:274). Furthermore, A. Cevdet advocates an 
authoritarian regime or despotic state to secularize the country by banning the 
traditional life style. This is also in accordance with the positivist maxim of 
“progress in order”. A. Cevdet does not suggest to give up Islam totally, but
33As a matter o f fact, whether the reform proposals belong to Abdullah Cevdet is debatable. This proposals 
were published by Kıhçzade Hakkı. However, similarities between the proposals and A. Cevdet’s view  
have led some scholars to think that the proposals belong to A. Cevdet ( For this, see Hanioğlu, n.d. :367).
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according to him, Islam should be transformed to a more rational and scientific 
position (Işın, n.d.:367-368). A. Cevdet’s understanding of secularism advocated 
full modernization-Westernization of the country. He suggested a revolutionary and 
unifying secularization program explained above. Cevdet criticized some 
secularists, such as Celal Nuri, who did not advocate for a full Westernization of 
Turkey, arguing that they could not appreciate the necessity of Westernization in all 
aspects of life (Mert, 1992:79).
Another positivist is Kıhçzade Hakkı. He, in his '"''İtikad-ı Batilaya îlan-ı 
Hard' (Promulgation of War Against The False-beliefs) (1911) (Kara, 1990:270) 
argued that some “blind fanatics” degenerated Islam. Therefore, that there was a 
need for a new scientific interpretation of Islam to acquire original or authentic 
Islam.” This was because, religion and science could not impinge on each other, 
and they should be consonant with each other. However, the point here is that the 
criterion is science, not religion. In other words, the idea that genuine religion could 
not conflict with science nor with the idea of progress is very positivitic (Mert, 
1992:80). Hence, Kıhçzade Hakkı looked for positivist religion based on science 
and progress^ "*.
We can observe a different positivist secularism in Ziya Gökalp^ .^ Firstly, 
Ziya Gökalp was a positivist, inspired by Comte and Durkheim (Londau, 1981:364; 
Mardin, 1990:160; Okyar, 1984:46; Korlaelçi,1986:347; Türkdoğan, 1987:passim; 
Fmdikoglu, 1971:144). Gökalp tried to install “sociology” into religion. According 
to Gökalp, sociology should be considered as an “usul-i fık ıh ” (method of 
jurispundence), since sociology is a science that tries to find out the “laws” in social 
relations installed by God. Hence, according to this mentality, there should not be
"^*It can be possible to obsei-ve the positivistic explanation o f Islam in other modernist muslini thinkers out of 
Turkey, such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his followers (Shirak Ali, Muhsin Mülk, and Mümtaz Ali). See, A. 
Ahmad, Hindistan ve Pakistan’da M odemizm ve İslam (İstanbul: Yöneliş, 1990).
^^For a recent study on Gökalp’s view on secularization and modernization, and criticisms o f Heyd’s book 
(Foundatios o f Turkish Nationalism), see Andrew Davison, “Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: 
the Ideas o f Ziya Gökalp”, Economy and Society, vol:24, no:2. May 1995.
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any contradiction between science and God’s law. Therefore, “içtim ai usul-i fık ıh ” 
(social method of jurispundence) can be regarded as a source of jurispundence. He 
declares that such içtim ai usul belongs to the positive sociology (Korlaelçi, 
1986:361). As Gökalp searches a religious legitimacy for secular jurispundence, he 
puts society in a sublime position, following positivist Durkheim’s and Comte’s 
line, and he defines the divinity in social terms. This can be seen in his poem:
There are no “I” or “you” but “we”
We are both OgaiiGod) and (mortal)
“We” means “One”
“I” and “You” worship to it^  ^ (Korlaelçi, 1986:366).
The similarity of this poem with Durkheim’s words is very interesting: “It is society 
that we really worship” (Bilton, 1987:415).
36We see the impact o f positivism on Ziya Gokalp on other matters, for example in his poem below is a 
good example for a Positivist mind:
"İnsanlarm ilk mürşidi kimlerdir? 
Hiç şüphesiz peygamberler,velililer. 
Bu devirde din, hikmete rehberdir;
Ahlak, san’at hep o nurdan alır fer... 
Fakat sonra din yerini ham zühde 
Verir, artık coşkun vecdi azalır; 
Velilerin yeller eser yerlerinde, 
Mürşid adı fakihlere miras kalır. 
Fakihlerin kılavuzu nakliyyat.
Dini zorla sürükler bu yola...
Hikmet derki bana rehber akliyyat.
O halde siz sağa gidin ben sola 
Din niürebbi olur, hikmet muallim; 
Her biri çeker bir yana!
Savaşırken bunlar, çıkar meydana 
Tecrübeden doğma nıüsbet bir ilim;
Bu son üstad der ki ’’Nakil tarihtir. 
Akıl yolu bu tarihin usulü;
İkisi de aynı şeyi gösterir 
Matlub olan: mhun vusulü!”
(Korlaelçi, 1986:366-367).
O şey nedir?...bir vecidli gönülmü 
Kudsi olan her şey ona dil midir? 
Öyle ise al benim son sözümü;
Din kalpteki vecdin nıüsbet ilmidir!”
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3.4.3.1. Kemalism and Positivism
Kemalism is a product of the positivist Young Turk movement. It is a successor of 
the Young Turk ideas (Köker, 1990:70; 1995:18; Özbudun,1984: passim; Rustow, 
1973:104, 118; Timur, 1971: 128). So much so that, according to Zürcher 
(1994:95), the Young Turk era in Turkish history extends between 1908 and 1950. 
Hence, Kemalism has a positivist mentality (Timur, 1971:138; Timur, n.d.:94; 
Mardin, 1983:88).
According to Timur (1968:114-115), the intellectual system of Atatürk is 
based on positivism, since for Atatürk, science is the principal concept. For Timur 
(1968:114-115), the existence or nonexistence of a direct positivist influence by 
Comte or other positivists is not important.
According to Mardin, the characteristics of Atatürk’s understanding of 
science is that science is used to shape society, and hence from this perspective, he 
is a positivist. For Mardin (1990:164), Atatürk was influenced by positivism 
indirectly, that is, he was not affected by the “fathers” of positivism directly. 
Positivism dominated Atatürk’s mind through the institutions of education and 
traditional structure that facilitated such a positivist development. Atatürk was 
educated in the Military school that was one of the important places where 
positivism developed. Modern education in these schools prepared a proper 
condition to the development of positivism (Mardin, 1983b:88; Okay, n.d:58-59).
Furthermore, some scholars state that Ziya Gökalp, Abdullah Cevdet, and 
Kılıçzade Hakkı were three important persons that affected Atatürk. According to 
Uriel Heyd (1950:170), Gökalp is a bridge between Atatürk and the Young Turks. 
Also, Berkes says that Gökalp heavily affected Atatürk’s mentality. Gökalp’s 
influence, according to Berkes, could be seen in Atatürk’s understanding of
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democracy, Westernization, nationalism and secularism (Gökalp, 1959:13-14). We 
can argue that Atatürk’s understanding of religion can be classified as Durklieimian 
(Mardin, 1986:42). In addition, A. Cevdet’s influence on Atatürk can be 
understood better if we take into consideration of A. Cevdet’s “Very Wakeful 
Sleep” that I mentioned before. It is interesting that in the special library of Atatürk, 
there is a book sent by A. Cevdet (Turan, 1982:48). According to Akural “it seems 
possible that Kemalist circles were familiar with the theory of the three stages of 
human intellectual development: magical, supernatural and scientific” (Akural, 
1984:143). In addition, the fundamental goal of Kemal Atatürk was the total 
modernization of the Turkish state and society (Kili, 1969:106). This fundamental 
goal is regarded as positivist by Arkoun (1994:559). Positivist mind of Atatürk can 
be best observed in his famous motto “ the truest mentor {mürşid) in life is
5537science .
Furthermore, it is also possible to see the impact of the evolutionary 
positivism, which was stated before in this chapter, on the views of Atatürk 
(İnalcık, 1987: 33). For example, it is possible to see Social Darwinism, which 
belongs to the evolutionary positivism that I explained at the beginning of this 
chapter, in his words: "Nation has accepted that science and tecniques that are roots 
of life and power in the international struggle can be found in the contemporary 
civilization" (Timur, 1971: 139).
want to call attention to the word o f mürşid, since it does not only mean “mentor” or “guide”. It is a 
religious concept that has occupied an important place in Turkey. In the terminology o f Islam, mürşid 
means a person who can direct what wrong is and what right is.( H. Akay, İslâmî Terimler Sözlüğü, 
(İstanbul: Islamic Information Center-IIC,1991) p.236). Specifically, mürşid is şeyh o f a (Islamic
mystical order). (S. Uludağ, Tasavvuf Terimleri Sözlüğü, (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınlan, 1991), p.354). 
Prophet Muhammet has been called as ""mürşid-i azam '\Û \e greatest Mürşid). (S. Eraydm, Tasavvuf ve 
Tarikat, (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınlan, 1990) p.l29. Mahir İz, Tasavvuf, (İstanbul: Kitabevi,1990) p .l62- 
163, and Y. N. Öztürk, Kur'an-ı Kerim ve Sünnete Göre Tasavvuf İslam'da Ruhi Hayat, (İstanbul: 
Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1989) p.395-403). Therefore, it may be thought that 
Atatürk might express the religious side o f science to replace the theological religion. This is expressed as 
“semantic secularization” by Webster (n.d.:36).
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It can be seen that Atatürk’s understanding of secularism and religion was generally 
in accordance with his mentality- positivism that heavily affected the Young Turks’ 
mind.
This fact is also expressed by Mardin (1993:360):
Thus, change came in at the beginning as a datum of Western 
positive science. In this light, the ülema who had not kept up with 
the expansion of the intellectual horizons came increasingly to be 
seen as ignorant charlatans rather than as repositories of ancient 
wisdom. This was one of the factors which propelled the students 
into a clear confrontation with religion. In the future, references to 
the need for change and to the way that religion was an obstruction 
to progress was to become a leitmotif in Atatürk’s writings.
Furthermore, according to Akural, “Atatürk, like the Young Turks, justifiably 
perceived the ülema as a hindrance to social change (read as progress, ARU)” 
(Akural, 1984:127).
So far, it can be understood that there is a parallelism between Atatürk and 
the Young Turks here. Atatürk himself perceived the existing religion as müstahase 
and old fashioned. Hence, Atatürk’s understanding of secularism is to get rid of the 
old fashioned müstahase or “itikadat-i batıla”os a barrier or hindrance on the road 
of progress. Hence, as Timur (1968:117) puts, the positivist philosophy is the base 
of secularity.
Furthermore, by virtue of secularism, Kemalism tried to substitute “scientific 
mind” for religion (Timur, 1968:125). This fact is stated in Mardin’s words (1986: 
42):
The main problem is how to substitute science as a main element 
for “religion”. Religion was the main source of legitimacy for the 
Anatolian people in their relation with the universe. Atatürk’s
3.4.3.2. Kemalism, Religion, and Positivist Secularism
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union is the natural laws. The ultimate attitude in that point is 
different from other around him. The effort of Atatürk to bring the 
natural law to the main philosophy of the Republic proves that he 
considered the science as a ‘civil religion’. In that point, Atatürk 
was thinking in a braver and deeper manner than most of his 
friends.
The argument above is also put by Donalt Webster. According to him, “the 
philosophy that gave a life to neonatal Republic was c iv il religion  and its prophet 
was Kemal Atatürk”. Webster wants to consolidate his argument with the words of 
Atatürk: “The tmest tarikat (Sufi order) is the tarikat of civilization^**” (Webster, 
n.d:34).
Furthermore, according to Akural “the Kemalists supposed that turning 
away from Islam toward scientific knowledge would create a new Kemalist man, 
highly logical and experimental; thus they vociferously encouraged Turkish youth 
to study science” (Akural, 1984:128). The words above are confiiTned by Feroz 
Ahmad (n.d.:44-46) and Karpat (1959:271). For Ahmad and Karpat, the aim of 
Kemalist secularism was to create ‘‘'rationalist”, ‘‘hum anist”, “scientific-m inded, ” 
“anti-traditionalist”, and “anti-clericalist” individual through throwing away 
irrationality like religion that is not consonant with science.
Lastly, according to Mete Tunçay, the sources of Kemalist secularism are 
Atatürk’s mind and views, and moreover, the views of Atatürk on religion, for 
Tunçay, are “rational theology” and “natural religion” in accordance with the
*^*It is important to mention here that for Atatürk, “civilization” means “modern science”and technology 
(Macfie, 1994: 138 ; Timur, 1971:140). Atatürk stated his thought on this matter as follows:
“Suiviving in the world o f modern civilization depends upon changing ourselves. This is the sole 
law any progress in the social, economic and scientific spheres o f life. Changing the rules o f life in 
accordance with the times is an absolute necessity. In an age when inventions and the wonders o f science 
bringing change after change in the conditions o f life, nations can not maintain their existence by age-old 
rotten mentalities and by tradition-worshipping...Superstitions and nonsense have to be thrown out o f our 
heads” (Berkes, 1964:464). Also, Timur (1968:113) thinks that Atatürk appreciated the Western 
Civilization because o f its modem science. A. Sayılı (1988:75) agrees with the statements above. For him, 
“on the base o f Atatürk’s civilization, there is science”.
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nineteenth centuiy positivism. Hence, Atatürk’s understanding of secularism is 
positivistic (Tunçay, 1989:213).^^
In addition to create some kind of “civil religion” that depends upon science, 
we observe some attempts to “rationalize” Islam and shape “scientific Islam” to 
transform it to a more rational, scientific disenchanted religion (Timur, 1971: 148). 
In other words, religion was redefined in terms of science, and some parts of 
religion were tried to be replaced science (Daver, 1955:4-5). However, according to 
Tunçay (1989:220), the “reformation of Islam” was not realized due probably to the 
fear o f revitalization of religion. For Daver (1986:37) “ alternatives open to the 
Kemalist cadres in the 1920’s were either to reform Islam radically enough to 
become a progressive force-Atatürk unsuccesfully tried it in some cases-or to 
restrict religious liberties to a great extent than in secular western states. In view of 
the enormous difficulties involved in the first alternative, it was only natural that the 
latter course was chosen.” Ozbudun (1966:17) agrees with Daver in this contexf°, 
but at the final analysis, rationalization and scientification o f Islam with reformation 
has been in agenda so far“*'. In that context, Atatürk’s words are important: “Our 
religion is the most reasonable and the most natural xoiigxon. And due to this fact, it 
becomes the last religion. A religion, in order to be natural, should be consonant 
with reason, science and logic. Our religion is consonant with them.”
Another aspect of the positivist secularism of Kemalism is its authoritarian 
regime. In other words, Kemalist secularism has also the authoritarian aspect of 
positivism. According to Koker, Kemalist secularism that seems as ‘controlling of
39According to Tuncay, Atatürk was not an atheist, but a deist. G. Ellison, who inteiwiewed Atatürk, says 
that in the inteiwiew Atatürk said: “ I have no religion, and sometimes I want to throw all religions to the 
sea.... My people will learn the principals o f democracy, its order and the doctrine o f science. All false- 
belifs should go ” ( G. Ellison, Turkey Today, s.24, in Tuncay, 1989:219).
"*^^According to Mardin (1962:293-297; 1983:170) the Young Turks first tried to create a scientific Islam, 
but later they gave up Islam and applied to positivism in the full sense.
"^ Mt is important to mention here a reform proposal on Islam that was prepared by some scholars o f the 
Faculty o f Theology o f the İstanbul DarııIRmümı (the Istanbul University) on the leadership o f Fuad 
Köprülü in 1928. However, due to intensive reaction, this proposal could not be carried out.
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religion’ cannot only be explained by the argument that Islam has a powerful 
political dimension. Another factor that explains the authoritarian character of the 
secularist policy, for Koker, is that Kemalist secularism is authoritarian, since it has 
‘a mission to transform society to a scientific phase’ to render some political 
tools to jettison the false-beliefs, and to realize a substitution of science in 
accordance with the positivist mentality. In other words, there needs a strong 
centralized and authoritarian regime to “progress in order”. Essentially, Ozbudun 
(1981:89-90) confirms this from a different perspective: “If it is true that 
authoritarian regimes tend to have mentalities rather than ideologies, then the 
mentality that fits the RPP (the Republican People’s Party) best is a positivist 
mentality”.
In my opinion, the positivist secularism of Kemalism can be discerned best 
in the reforms. One of these reforms is about education. According to Kdker, 
Kemalist secularism aimed to transform the society through eliminating false- 
beliefs by the virtue of the education in sch ools. For Koker (1990:88),
The transformation of values that is aimed by secularism with 
education shows an interesting characteristic for the positivist 
understanding carried out in the name of ‘positive and 
experimental science’ by Mustafa Kemal and his circle. If we 
accept that positivism comes to the thought of the Young Turks 
and from there to Kemalism in a Comtean style, it should be 
accepted that the understanding and application of Kemalist 
Secularism want to install a new belief system (a new “religion”). 
According to Auguste Comte’s ‘law of three stages’, every stage is 
determined by a system of belief and organization. In the positive 
stage, dominant belief system is ‘science’. To put it in a truer 
manner, in the positive stage a ‘faith of science (bilim imam)’ is 
valid. The understanding of modernity of Kemalism depends upon 
the tenet of ‘the truest mentor is science’; secularism, in this 
framework, gained the meaning of substitution of the scientific 
faith and organization for the Islamic belief system.
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Bursalıoğlu (1988:88) agrees with Köker’s argument above. After accepting that the 
main philosophy of Atatürk is positivism, he says that secular society can be 
achieved through the education system in which Atatürk’s education philosophy 
(positivist philosophy) exists. This argument is also confirmed by Karpat (1959: 56) 
and Oztelli (1974:80). Karpat (1973a:77) emphasizes the role of L ises in this 
context. For him, Lises were key instruments to install the elitist and positivist 
views.“*^ Furthermore, Kongar (1986:32) argues, in a similar manner, that the 
reorganization of education was for the secularization of culture.“*^
The second reform that is a product of the positivist secularism is the change 
of the alphabet from the Arabic script to the Latin script. This jettisoning of the 
Arabic script was realized so as to secularize society and realize a fikri inkılap^ 
(the intellectual revolution) in Turkey. Thus, the “alphabet revolution” aimed to 
create a “/7ewnation that had an identity without a religious past” (Köker, 1990:88). 
In other words, the aim was to create a “nation of forgetters” that could forget its 
past (read religious past) (Toprak, 1981:42; Sayan, 1978:176). Although this is not 
said openly, it can be understood from Atatürk’s words:
My friends (he said),our rich and harmonious language will now 
be able to display itself with new Turkish letters. We must free 
ourselves from these incomprehensive signs, that for centuries 
have held our minds in an iron vice (my emphasis). You must 
learn the new Turkish letters quickly. Teach them to your 
compatriots, to women and to men, to partners and to boatmen.
Regard it as a patriotic and national duty... and when you perform 
that duty, bear in mind that for a nation to consist of ten or twenty 
percent of illiterates is shameful... The fault is not own; it is of 
those who failed to understand the character of the Turks and 
bound his mind in chains. Now is the time to eradicate the errors of
"*“It is important to mention the words of Adnan Adivar: “Within the last twenty years the vast majority of 
Turkish youtli has been brought up without any official religious teaching, Western positivism being 
imposed on it just as Islamic dogma had been imposed in the past.” Adivar, “Interaction of Islamic and 
Western Thought in Turkey”, Near Eastern Culture and Societ, cited in (Karpat, 1959:56).
Atatürk said "By virtue o f scliool, and science and technics that were provided by school, Turkish 
nation, Turkish economy, Turkish poet and literature will develop with whole beauties" (Sayih,1987:653).
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the past. We shall repair these errors, and in doing so I want the 
participation of all our compatriots. Our nation will show, with its 
scrip t (my emphasis) and with its m ind  (my emphasis), that its 
place is with the civ ilized  world (my emphasis) ( Cited in 
Lewis, 1911:278).
We can add to the list the reforms of abolishing the traditional-religious clothes,“*'* 
hicri calendar, closing of tekkes and zaviyes  and so on. All these were carried out 
to realize “political-cultural secularization” to eliminate all religious symbols and 
irrationality. These aims can be seen in Atatiirk’s words:
Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on the 
heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, 
fanaticism, and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its 
place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilized world, and 
in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality 
as in other respect, in no way diverges from civilized social life 
(Lewis, 1961:268).
And,
Gentlemen, the Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic 
are civilized; they are civilized in history and in reality. But I tell 
you as your brother, as your friend, as your father, that the people 
of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must show and 
prove that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by 
their family life and their way of living. In a word, the truly 
civilized people of Turkey... must prove in fact that they are 
civilized and advanced persons also in their outward aspect....
Is it (our dress) civilized and international? (Cries of no, no!)
I agree with you. This grotesque mixture of styles is neither 
national nor international....A civilized, international dress is 
worthy and appropriate for our nation, and we will wear it. Boots 
or shoes on own feet, trousers on our legs, shirt and tie, jacket and 
waistcoat-and of course, to complete these, a cover with a brim on 
our heads. I want to make this clear. This head-covering is called 
‘hat’ (Lewis, 1961:268-9).
'*'*According to Georg Simmel, there is a direct relationship between clothes and mentalities 
(Gole, 1994:127).
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A more delicate matter was that of female clothing. Atatiirk’s speech at Kastamonu 
on 30 August 1925;
In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a 
towel or something like it over their heads to hide their face, and 
who turn their backs or huddle themselves on the ground when a 
man passes by Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a 
civilized nation adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture?
It is a spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must 
be remedied at once (Lewis, 1961:271).
According to Arkoun (1994:55-56) in the speeches above, eliminating symbols of 
the style of a collective existence first, then “the will of creating new symbols” can 
be discerned well. The target, for Arkoun, is not the Arabic script itself, but the 
cultural application that had been used for a very long time. The matter is not to 
prefer hat to fez, the matter is to prefer a civilization carried by “histoiy and 
realities” to “ignorance”. Atatürk, Arkoun argues, wanted to change the “collective 
mind” from the appearance. In Arkoun’s mind, this is accordance with the positivist 
principles.
Lastly, in addition to the RPP and Lises as centers to spread 
secularism/positivism in the Kemalist one party era, the People’s Houses (Halk 
Evleri) served to spread this ideology (Kongar, 1986:39-41; Zürcher,1994:187-8).
3.4.3.3. Positivist Secularism In Other Republican Secularists
One important name is Halil Nimetullah. He was a disciple of Ziya Gokalp. 
According to Halil Nimetullah (1991:245-6), religion is a social institution which is 
important for spiritual needs of individuals. But, he is more predisposed to regard 
religion as a matter of conscience. According to him, religion should be limited to 
private sphere. He thought it would be illegitimate for religion to subordinate all
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social life. He did not accept the “reformation of Islam”. He proposed that the 
religion should be investigated with “today’s scientific method”. Thus, the modern 
values could be found in Islam (Halil Nimetullah: 1991:250; and Mert,1992:87).
Another name is Sabri Ethem. According to him, the revolutions had brought 
Turkish society to a new stage. Hence, the tradition that was religious and theocratic 
would disappear. The positive science was the reached, hence positive science was 
the main source for everything (Mert, 1992:101). Furthermore, Necmeddin Sadık 
believed that “a new set of morals” was necessary for Turkey that depended upon 
science and reason, instead of the theological religion (Mert, 1992:105).
Celal Nuri (İleri) is another important name for the Republican period. He 
accepted only one way to get the truth: Science. Celal Nuri’s opinions on religion 
came from positivist Renan (Bolay,n.d:178). He did not advocate for some reforms 
on Islam, he said “No, we are not an imitator of Luther. We recommend to increase 
the progressive character of Islam” (Bolay, n.d:180). However, some scholars put 
forward that Celal Nuri changed his ideas above, and he had more anti-clerical, 
anti- religious ideas (Bolay, n.d:183).
We can see that also RPP, in that era, gained a positivist understanding of 
secularism. Secularity in the 1931 and 1935 party programmes, like other 
programmes before, was defined as making law and governing the state in 
accordance with the basic principle of science and technology (Parla, 1992:45).
A similar positivistic tendency can be observed in the Kadro movement. 
According to Yanardağ (1988:130), positivism was a “minimum common ground” 
between the state and the Kadro. This can be observed in some articles that were 
published in the joumal-Kadro. For example, the idea that anti-mysticism and 
thinking need a strong secularism to “clear” the society can be seen in Tahir 
Hayrettin’s article (1933) that was published in the Kadro"^.
According to Halide Edip (Adivar), Kadrolmd an anti-clerical view (Karpat,1959: 71).
77
The positivist understanding of secularism continued after Atatürk’s death. 
According to Heper (1985:73) “secularism, for instance, acquired in time excessive 
anti-clerical, positivistic characteristics-so much so that it was later labeled ‘an 
official dogma of irréligion’” . Karpat (1959:271) agrees with Heper:
The policy followed by the government in implementing a 
secularist policy, although never impairing the freedom of worship 
nor imposing a new creed upon the society, acquired in time 
excessive anti-clerical, positivistic characteristics which were 
labelled later as ‘an official dogma of irréligion’."*®
3.4.3.4. Sociology as a Science of Turkish Secularism
Sociology emerged as an independent discipline in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. The founder o f sociology is Comte, who is also the “fathef’of positivism 
as stated before. Hence sociology emerged in a very positivistic manner. In other 
words, sociology was a means to discover “social laws” in society, and to serve 
them for the well-being of societies, as Bilton et al. (1987:559) says:
If Comte’s birth coincides with the height of revolutionary change 
in French society, his mature work consists of an attempt to 
recreate order in that society, through the application of true 
knowledge, as produced by science. The fact that Comte coined the 
label ‘sociology’ ...is not the only reason to regard him as the 
application of the positivist faith in discoverable laws to social 
phenomena. The implications were colossal, for positive 
sociological knowledge (my emphasis) could alter the means for 
peaceful reconstruction of social order by the élite of 
enlightenment (my emphasis) scientists and intellectuals.
"*®It can be useful to mention some words o f poet Can Yücel, who is the son of the famous minister o f  
education Hasan Ali Yücel : “ I have been an atheist since the beginning. This is due to the characterisricts 
of the time when I grew up. I was born in 1926. This was the time of the severest anti-clericalism. My 
father was a part o f the policy of the state. Essentially, my family was Mawlavi. My grandmother was 
from the tekke o f MevLinakapi. My grandfather was so too....Although mygradfather had a great tolerance, 
he opposed to the polity o f anti-clericalism. He...deserted home. The family had lost a member.” (“An 
Inteiwiew with Can Yücel”, İzlenim, December 1992, no:l, p p .ll).
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In other words, sociology was developed by Comte when French society was in a 
social crisis, and it attempted to get rid of the crises. In such a position, French 
statesmen started to take into account Comtean and then Durkheimian sociology to 
find out remedies for social problems, and to succeed social reforms.
A parallel development was seen in Turkey. That is to say, as stated before, 
the Ottoman-Turkish state élite in the second half of the nineteenth century and the 
twentieth century was seeking a remedy to solve the problems of the society. This 
remedy was the use of positivist sociology to save the empire (İlyasoğlu, n.d:2164; 
Coşkun,1991: 13; Tuna, 1991:29; Tüfekçioğlu, 1991:141). In those times, sociology 
developed in the hands of the state élite, first the Young Turks, and then the 
Republican élite. This development of sociology had an ideological character. In 
other words, Turkish sociology developed on an ideological basis (İlyasoğlu, 
n.d:2165). This ideology was positivism (Ergun,n.d:2160). In that period many of 
the important names and journals on sociology can be regarded as positivist. These 
were Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Rıza, Ahmet Şuayp, M. Cavit, Bedii Nuri, H. Cahit, 
Mustafa Suphi and Sati’el Hüsri, Necmeddin Sadık (Sadak), A. Cevdet, Celal Nuri, 
İsmail Hakkı and M. İzzet. Many of these persons gathered around Ulum-u 
ik tisadiyye ve İçtim aiyye  (The Sciences of Economy and Sociology) that was the 
first sociological and philosophical movement in the full sense (Ülken, 1992:159). 
In the first issue of Ulum-u ik tisadiyye ve İçtim aiyye, A. Şuayp, M. Cavit, and 
R.Tevfik, who established the Journal, explained the programme of the journal as 
follows:
We have defended the journal against the attacks of a great 
newspaper and journal thinking that it will answer serious needs of 
our country. We will try to increase the level of the journal so that 
it can serve to the economic and social education of the nation.... 
Our journal, at the same time, is a journal of social sciences. 
Physique sociale {hikmet-i igtimaiyye) of the school of Auguste
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Comte and Science Sociale {jlm -i Cemiyet) of the school of Le 
Play have been developed so much so that they investigate all 
subjects. Today, knowledge of human on philosophy, history, 
ethics, education and art has totally changed.... These changes 
were due to science. The founder of the social science might not 
imagine this rise of the social science more than the cultures of the 
nations. All Western thinkers say that the statesmen cannot 
succeed reforms and they cannot find remedies for the social 
problems without advising their advisors, that is the social 
sciences. Therefore, our journal will publish detailed articles that 
rest upon the productive works of the masters (Ülken, 1992:161).
Furthermore, the evolutionary-positivist character of the Ulum existed in the view 
of Ahmet Şuayp (Ülken, 1992:162), and this character of the journal increased 
especially with Bedii Nuri, Asaf N e f i and Dr. Ethem Faik Nüzhet (Ülken, 
1992:161), and Mustafa Suphi (İlyasoğlu, n.d:2167). In other words, the Spencerian 
character of the journal became more influential in the time. For example. Bedii 
Nuri and Sati were heavily affected by René Worms. In addition, as stated before. 
Ziya Gökalp was the most influential person of the last period of the empire and the 
early republican era in sociological thinking. He tried to adapt Durkheimian 
sociology into Turkey, and he affected the study of sociology in Turkey.
In short, sociology entered Turkey as a “positivist ideology”. Here, it is 
important to answer the questions of what the roles of this sociology were in the 
secularization of Turkey. In my opinion, three kinds of the usage of sociology by 
the state élite can be stated. Sociology was first used, with its modern/positivist 
character, to work for new definitions that would stand-in for religious definitions 
of social reality, secondly the religious definitions of reality were subjected to the 
authority of the modern/secular/positivist view through the sociological 
inteipretation o f religion (Mert, 1992:134), and thirdly sociology helped to 
legitimize the practices of the positivist secularism in Turkey.
The first kind of the usage of the sociology that was argued above is 
explained by Mert (1992:118) as follows:
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Sociology, which replaced the role of religion in defining social 
phenomena found extensive acceptance and expression within the 
framework of Turkish secularism. This acceptance was part and 
parcel of the fascination with scientific knowledge concerning the 
new definition of human phenomena on behalf of the Turkish 
secularist. The acceptance of a “scientific” definition of 
social/human phenomena was unconditional, as was the 
unconditional surrender to scientific thought. The latter was seen 
as the framework of knowledge that was supposed to replace the 
religious framework.
The sociological explanation of religion and social reality found great recognition 
and expression both before the Republic and after its establishment.
The second kind of usage was that sociology redefined religion in 
accordance with its positivist manner. This was also recognized by the Turkish 
intelligentsia. Celal Nuri’s words are a good example of the redefinition of religion. 
According to him, there cannot be any contradiction between religion and science. 
What is not consonant with science, it should not be consonant with religion. 
Hence, he argued that true religion could be found by virtue of science (Bolay, 
n.d;181). Another sociologist was Ismail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu). He was a Bergsonist 
and Durkheimian (Ülken, 1992:452). The “scientific explanation of religion” was 
observed in his book “Din ve Hayat” (Religion and Life). According to him, 
religion should be subjected to “scientific inquiry”. In his opinion, if religion does 
not compromise with science, it will lose all its credibility at the individual and 
social levels. Therefore, for Ismail Hakkı, religion that is responsive to the 
requirements of the age “must base on scientific foundations and in the case of 
religion the proper science was obviously sociology^ 1992:121-122). Similar 
attempts to redefine religion in accordance with sociology were seen in the 
universities and high schools. The textbooks of universities and high schools were 
prepared to explain Comtean and Durkheimian sociology (Ergun, n.d:2161).
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Therefore, the positivist redefinition of religion continued to be dominant for a long 
time.
The third kind of usage was that sociology helped to legitimize the role of 
the secularist, positivist state élite in their transformation of the society who would 
elevate society to a superior state in the evolution of progress. It is interesting that 
in the Ottoman classical period, religion had been used to legitimize the practices of 
the Ottoman state élite, now, the practices were letimized by sociology.
To sum up, the sociology in the period of the second half of the nineetenth 
century and early republican period entered Turkey in a positivist manner, and it 
was used to replace religion on defining the "truth", to redefine religion in 
accordance with positivism hence to secularize it, and to legitimize or justify the 
practices of the élite to modernize and secularize the country.
3.5. Conclusion
Considering science and reason as the ultimate means to get the truth is positivism. 
Such positivism stretches to the starting points of the Renaissance. With the 
growing of science, science separated itself from religion. This changed the 
prevailing paradigm; knowledge was secularized. In the 19th century, Comte and 
his followers systematized their positivist ideas. On the other hand, parallel to the 
development mentioned above. Western Europe became the predominant power in 
the world militarily, economically, technologically and culturally, and hence, 
European Countries could establish their superiority over the Ottoman Empire, 
especially in the military in the beginning.
In those times, generally in all the Islamic world, and specifically in the 
Ottoman Empire, two great declines or retreats were present. One retreat was due to 
the superiority of the West, compared with the Ottomans, another was the inner 
retreat of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world that started in the sixteenth
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century. The Ottoman statesmen saw the bad run of events, and wanted to stop that 
development firstly through the domestic solution. When they understood its 
impossibility, they tended to turn to the West. This was a turning point in Turkish 
history. And, they tried to find the secret of the Western Supremacy. Especially in 
the 19th century when positivism was dominant, the Ottoman statesmen and 
intellectuals found the secret: i/7u/n ve iunun. The Ottoman élite started to seek the 
mentality behind science and technology. They thought that this mentality behind 
the secret was positivism.
Turkish intelligentsia in the nineteenth century generally became positivistic. 
We see that positivism affected especially the cadres of the Young Turks. When the 
cadres got power in 1908 through the UP, Turkish secularism started. Behind this 
secularism, there was the positivist ideology. This positivist secularism that reached 
its zenith in Atatürk’s period aimed to progress by virtue of secularization of the 
country. In this period, we observe some characteristics, such as creating a scientific 
and rational religion. The Kemalist understanding-positivist-secularism continued 
after Atatürk’s death.
Whether or not Kemalism has succeded the aim that was stated above is a 
different story, and it is controversial. However, I can put, as Mardin did, that 
paradoxically, Kemalism as the Turkish version of positivism, did not take into 
consideration Comte’s words:
“L  ’ Humanité se sebstitute définitivement a Dieu, sans oublier jam ais ses 
services provisoires” (Jhe (religion of) Humanity itself replaces that of God, but 
without forgetting the functions of the God’s (religion)) ( Mardin, 1995:11).
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CONCLUSION
This study aimed to explain secularity and an important part of the 
intellectual content of the Turkish secularism, that is, positivism.
According the author of this study, the concept secularity is a multi­
dimensional term. All the dimensions of secularity that were explained in the first 
chapter are processes through which a “traditional” (non-modern and non-secular) 
society becomes modem and “secular”. According to the general secularization 
secularization theory, these processes of secularization are very related with the 
modernization process. In other words, secularity can be regarded as an important 
part o f the modernization process. The classical modernization/secularization 
theoiy, which was developed by its so-called “fathers”, such as Weber and 
Durkheim, argued for the ultimacy of secularization that was defined as a decline of 
religious authority with the modernization process, and the incompatibility of 
religion as a Weltanschauung with modernity. This classical theoiy of 
modernization/secularization has been heavily criticized by the revisionist approach 
to modernity and secularization for its unilinear, irreversible, historicist, and holistic 
characters. The revisionist approach defines secularization as the modification of 
religion to modern society, as opposed to the classical approach that considers 
secularization as the decline of religion. This revisionist understanding of 
secularization has been criticized by some scholars, who may be called as neo- 
classicists, since, accepting some critiques that originate from the revisionist 
approach, they continue to accept secularization as a process in which religious 
worldviews are replaced by modem ones. In the text, the temi secularization was
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used in accordance with the secularization theory which considers secularization as 
the decline o f religious authority vis-a-vis modernity.
Furthermore, secularism should be differentiated from secularization. 
Secularism was defined in this study as the ideology of the intelligentsia, including 
state élites, to transform “traditional” society to modem one, particularly to 
transform it from a “religious” to a “secular” society. Hence, secularism is also very 
related to the modem 1st/secularist intelligentsia including state élites.
The main aim of the study, as stated before, was to explain an important part 
of the intellectual content of the Turkish secularism-that is, positivism. For the 
author, the historical component of the secularization process in Turkey, that is, 
secularity in the Ottoman Empire in its classical age which was investigated in the 
second chapter, contributed to the development of both secularism and positivism, 
hence to positivist secularism in Turkey. In that context, according to the author, 
three important classical characteristics of Ottoman Empire can be mentioned. 
These were secular codes or jurisdiction, secular/pragmatic oriented bureaucracy, 
and secular adab tradition of the state (These three characteristics were not 
mutually exclusive). Without noticing these “secular” characteristics of the Ottoman 
Empire, it would difficult to explain, as Mardin says (1993:353), the 
secular/pragmatist mentality of the Ottoman Statesmen, such as Saffet Paşa (1814- 
83), who urged Turkey to adopt “the civilization of Europe in its entirety, in short, 
to prove itself a civilized state”. The mentality of the Paşa was clear: if Western 
civilization could rejuvenate the state, they could immediately be adopted, since 
nothing was more important than the state. The debate of secularity in the Ottoman 
Empire (and the Turkish Republic) is very related to the so-called special 
characteristics of Islam (the unity of state and religion) that is sometimes 
emphasized to show the differences from Christianity. However, it can be observed 
from the Ottoman case, as well as from the secularist approach, and (to some 
extent) from the third approach to the the case of “Islam and secularity”, that the
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argument of the “special characteristics” of Islam can be seriously challenged. It is 
seen that there is a close relationship between the debates of “Islam and secularity 
“ and the secularity in the Ottoman classical age, since the secularity in the Ottoman 
Empire in the pre-modern period (classical) was built on some Islamic terminology, 
such as istislah, îstihsan, and Maşlaha that were also used by the secularist view 
which attempts to secularize Islam by using these terms. Hence, it is important to 
know comprehensively the case of “Islam and Secularity” theoretically and 
historically before investigating a the secularization process in an Islamic country, 
such as Turkey.
The secularization process in Turkey was fundamentally in the intellectual 
domain. One of the important aspects of the mentality of this intellectual 
secularization process was positivism. Positivism, which was explained at the 
beginning of the third chapter, was dominant among the Turkish intelligentsia, 
including the state élite, in the 19th and in the first half of the 20th centuries. In that 
time, when positivism was dominant, Turkish secularism as a political ideology 
crystallized as an aspect of Westemization/modernization with the rise of the Young 
Turk movement as a dominant political power. Hence, in that time, secularism 
emerged in a positivistic manner. The main aim of the positivist secularism, which 
had been dominant from the rise of the Young Turks as a strong political power up 
to 1945/6, when the control over the exercise of positivist secularism in society 
somewhat relaxed, was to get rid of the mystical or “theological religion” that was 
regarded as a barrier on the road of progress and civilization which emphasized 
science and reason. It is important to mention here that the secularists, in that time, 
defined civilization as the Western/modern science. The concrete indicators of this 
kind o f secularism can be observed in the Kemalist reforms. The main reforms of 
Atatürk on cultural symbols and institutions, such as reforms on education, 
alphabet, calendar, clothes, and on tekkes and zaviyes and tiirhes which had been 
seen as irrational/mystical absurdities and were closed down, can be regarded as
8 6
reforms to create a scientific society. In addition to Atatürk, it is possible to observe 
positivist understanding of secularism in other Young Turks/Republicans such as 
Abdullah Cevdet, Kılıçzade Hakkı, Ziya Gökalp, and Celal Nuri. Sociology played 
an important role in this context. Three main roles of the positivist sociology in 
Turkey could be observed. These were the replacement of Islam in the definition of 
social reality, defining Islam in accordance with the positivist sociology, and 
legitimizing of the practices of the state elite on religion.
This kind of understanding of secularism can also be obseiwed in some other 
parts o f the World. For example, a similar development, that is the arrival of the 
nineteenth century positivism and the emergence of positivist secularism in the 
country, can be observed in the example ofBrazil.
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